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Professor Moshe Buchinsky, Chair
These essays contribute towards our understanding of applied microeconomics.
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies the effect of private
tutoring on human capital development. Private tutoring is a widespread service
in many countries. However, economic research focusing on the effect of private
tutoring on fundamental factors of human capital is scarce. I estimate two human
capital production functions in the context of private tutoring, one for cognitive
skills and the other for non-cognitive skills. To deal with endogeneity, I adopt the
control function approach, based on peer behavior and household budget. The fact
that cognitive and non-cognitive skills are not observable is addressed by the latent
factor model, which connects unobservable skills with observable measurements. I
find that private tutoring does not affect skill accumulation for both cognitive and
non-cognitive skills. I also find that peer behavior positively contributes to the use of
private tutoring. Chapter 2 explores effect of co-residing grandparents on educational
ii
investment for their grandchildren. Multigenerational households are not an unusual
type of household in developed and developing countries, but the educational effect
of this type of household on children has not been studied extensively in economic
literature. This paper explores the effect of coresiding grandparents on educational
investment for their grandchildren. First, by using Korean data, I show a significant
negative effect on educational investment. In addition, I also find that this negative
effect is directed toward female children. To explore the economic reasons behind the
effect, I test whether coresiding grandparents participate in the household decision-
making process by using statistical tests based on the collective model, and the results
show evidence of participation. Hence, the negative effect on educational investment
may be related to the preference of grandparents. Chapter 3 studies the effects
of generosity from a child care assistance policy on maternal labor supply behavior,
such as weekly working hours, and effects on the child care industry. These effects are
estimated by exploiting variation in the copayments amount and reimbursement rates
for a hypothetical family across multiple states over time. To minimize endogeneity,
the fact that the size of funding is largely decided by several state-level variables
is incorporated. The results suggest negative effects from higher copayments and
positive effects from higher reimbursement rates, although these are less pronounced
than those caused by the copayments. Only weak results are observed for the industry-
level effects.
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1 The Effect of Private Tutoring on Cognitive and
Non-Cognitive Skills
1.1 Introduction
In the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), private tutoring is a large industry.
According to the most recent government-run Private Education Expenditure Sur-
vey in 2016, the total expenditure for private tutoring, including both primary and
secondary education, was about 18 trillion Korean Won (hereafter, KRW), which is
more than 1% of GDP. In terms of usage, 67.8% of students in either the primary or
secondary stage of education participate in private tutoring and spend 6 hours per
week using the service.1
Private tutoring is also prevalent in other countries. Based on a 2012 OECD
survey of 64 countries, students in 26 countries spend on average more than one hour
per week attending classes run by for-profit companies after school.2 In addition,
Bray and Kwo (2014) reports that more than 65% of middle school students in China
and Japan attend supplementary lessons in 2004 and 2007, respectively.3
Regarding such an important issue, this paper aims to make two major contribu-
1Elementary schools (6 years) are for primary education. Middle schools (3 years) and
high schools (3 years) are for secondary education. GDP in 2016 is around 1,637 trillion
(http://www.index.go.kr).
2The 26 countries are Greece, Korea, Spain, Turkey, Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Colombia, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malaysia, Peru, Qatar,
Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, UAE, Uruguay, and Vietnam (Table 4.3.27.
(http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-IV.pdf)).
3Bray and Kwo Bray, M. and O. Kwo (2014). “Regulating Private Tutoring for Public Good:
Policy Options for Supplementary Education in Asia”, CERC Monograph Series in Comparative
and International Education and Development No. 10.
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tions to the literature. First, this is the first paper that studies the effect of private
tutoring on unobserved skills of human capital. This can help our understanding of
the effect of private tutoring by complementing the existing literature, which analyzes
the effect by using observable variables. Second, this paper analyzes the effect of peer
behavior on the use of private tutoring. Along with other research, this paper may
advance our knowledge of the peer effect on a variety of variables.
I estimate the effect of private tutoring on cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
These two types of skills have been extensively addressed in the literature focusing on
human capital development because of their importance. For instance, Heckman et
al. (2006) highlights the role of these two skills on labor market outcomes. Naturally,
factors that potentially affect the accumulation of these two skills are of interest
to researchers. Examples of such factors include family environment (Cunha et al.
(2010)) and bullying (Sarzosa (2017)).
In this paper, I estimate the effect of private tutoring on skills by taking into
account unobservable characteristics using the latent factor model, which has not
been studied in the literature. For example, test scores can be used as “proxy”
variables because the scores may contain information about skills. However, it is also
obvious that scores are not skills themselves. Treating observable measurements as
skills can create serious problems because of inherent measurement errors. As noted in
Levi (1973), measurements errors that arise from “proxy” variables can cause biased
estimates of all variables, including correctly measured variables.4 Hence, it is crucial
to address this issue for the purpose of this paper.
The substantial size of private tutoring in the market clearly suggests that analyz-
ing the effect of private tutoring is important. Students spend substantial amounts
4The direction of biases depend on the correlation between correctly measured variables and
variables with measurement errors, so the biases are not always attenuation biases (Levi (1973)).
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of time and money for private tutoring. If there is no effect on human capital at
all, then all consumers in the market, students and parents, are using their valuable
resources meaninglessly. It is also not a desirable situation from the perspective of a
social planner, because the distribution of resources may not be efficient. If there ex-
ist certain effects on the other hand, then exploiting the industry as a complement of
public education can be helpful in increasing the level of human capital on a national
level.
There are several reasons for us to conjecture that private tutoring may impact
the process of accumulating cognitive skills, which is an important component of hu-
man capital. The effect on cognitive skills is expected to exist, for the goal of using
private tutoring is to help students achieve better academic outcomes. If private
tutoring is indeed helpful to improve (observable) outcomes by increasing the (un-
observable) level of cognitive skills, it is possible to say that private tutoring has a
positive effect on cognitive skills. However, it may also be possible that private tutor-
ing improves students’ outcomes without any effect on cognitive skills. For example,
private tutoring may teach students simple skills, such as memorizing mathematical
formulas, which helps them to solve questions and increase their exam scores without
understanding the formulas.
Given the fact that most students use private tutoring in order to improve their
academic outcomes, suppliers of private tutoring may not intend to help the accumu-
lation of non-cognitive skills.5 However, such an effect may also exist. Fundamentally,
attending private tutoring classes provides opportunities for additional social inter-
actions. If students attend classes with multiple students, they can create friendship
among themselves. They can then be affected by the new “peer.” Another social
5Private Education Expenditure Survey in 2016.
3
interaction that arises from private tutoring is the interaction between students and
instructors. Students may not only gain academic knowledge but also other valuable
advice, such as having desirable attitudes toward life from instructors.6
Using a Korean data set that consists of middle school students, I estimate the
non-linear human capital production functions of each type of skill. I find that the
time devoted to private tutoring over a year does not have any effect on the stocks of
human capital at the end of the year, for both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In
addition, a feature of the data allows me to analyze the peer effect of private tutoring.
The first wave has information from a whole class of eighth grade students, so I am
able to use information about the usage of private tutoring by all the classmates. I
find that peer use of private tutoring has a positive effect.
There are two major issues that need to be addressed. The first issue is that,
by their nature, skills are not observable in the data. To address this issue, I adopt
the latent factor model. As the first step, I collect observable measurements such
as academic ranking from the data. It is straightforward to estimate parameters
related to the distribution of these measurements. After estimating these parameters,
I impose a “relationship” between observable measurements and unobservable skills.
The relationship gives a number of equations that can be used to link the distributions
of the measurements and the distribution of unobservable skills. Then, I estimate
the parameters of the distribution of unobservable skills and draw a synthetic data
set from it. The synthetic data set is used to estimate human capital production
functions, which include the skills.
Another issue is the endogeneity. This is because the use of private tutoring is
6In the context of the non-academic influence of teachers on students, Bettinger and Long
(2005) studies whether the role-model effects exist by studying the effect of the instructor’s gender
on female students. Dee (2005) analyzes the effect of students’ assignment to a demographically
similar instructor on outcomes.
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not assigned randomly. I use the control function approach to deal with this issue.
I estimate a function of the usage of private tutoring first. The function includes
instrumental variables that do not affect stocks of human capital directly: residuals
of household income and peer behavior.7 These variables indeed significantly and
positively affect the use of private tutoring, so they can be used as valid instrumen-
tal variables. The residuals of this regression are included in both human capital
production functions to address the endogeneity issue.
This paper builds on several strands of the earlier literature. Focusing on the
main finding, the ineffectiveness of private tutoring, there are a number of papers
that analyze the effect of private tutoring on a variety of outcomes. Dang (2007)
and Zhang (2013) study academic outcomes by using the data from Vietnam and
China, respectively. Dang (2007) finds significant impact on academic performance,
but Zhang (2013) finds an insignificant average effect on test scores. Kang and Park
(2015) uses observable variables to study the effect on non-cognitive outcomes by
using different Korean data. They find a positive effect on cognitive skills and an
insignificant effect on non-cognitive skills.8 There are also papers on the factors
affecting the use of private tutoring. As an example of a study on factors, Kim and
Lee (2010) finds that academically well-performing students and students from high
family income are likely to spend more on tutoring.
Another strand of the literature deals with the estimation of human capital pro-
duction functions along with unobservable variables using the latent factor model.
7Residuals of household income are from regression of household income on father’s years of
education.
8Kang and Park (2015) shares a similar fundamental question with this paper. For reference, I
include results from the ordinary regression models in Table 1.28 and Table 1.29. Similarly to Kang
and Park (2015), the tables show a significant and positive effect on cognitive skills, and a mixed
effect on non-cognitive skills.
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Each paper may focus on specific components that potentially affect the develop-
ment of human capital. A seminal paper is Cunha et al. (2010), which estimates the
production function with parental environments and investments. Attanasio et al.
(2017) and Attanasio et al. (2015) study human capital production functions in the
context of developing countries. This paper adopts the same empirical methodology
with these two papers. Besides parental investments, examples of other components
that have been studied are bullying in school (Sarzosa (2017)) and early age height
growth (Sa´nchez (2017)).
Lastly, the third strand consists of research papers addressing peer effect. There
are a lot of research papers that explore peer effect on a variety of topics, such as
drug use (Gaviria and Raphael (2001)), smoking (Powell et al. (2005), Nakajima
(2007)), employment outcomes (Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002)) and academic out-
comes (Sacerdote (2001), Ding and Lehrer (2007)). In this paper, I show that one’s
use of private tutoring is affected by his or her classmates’ behavior (i.e., their use of
private tutoring).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 shows the current status of the
market of private tutoring in Korea and explains the data set with basic statistics.
Section 1.3 addresses the model and the empirical methodology. Section 1.4 provides
the results from the estimation. Section 1.5 presents a number of the robustness
checks. Section 1.6 provides the conclusion.
1.2 Private Tutoring and Data
1.2.1 Private Tutoring in Korea
The use of private tutoring in Korea is common among students and is primarily
for academic purposes. Private tutoring is prevalent in both primary and secondary
6
education. The Private Education Expenditure Survey in 2016 reports that the ex-
penditures on primary education was about 7.75 trillion KRW, and that of secondary
education was about 10.25 trillion KRW. Hence, if it is effective, private tutoring
can be used for the accumulation of human capital for the entire adolescent popu-
lation. A considerable portion of expenditure is used for academic purposes. More
specifically, the proportion for academic purpose was about 87% of expenditures in
secondary education and about 74% in primary education. It suggests that private
tutoring is mainly expected to help children in achieving better academic outcomes.
These figures are consistent with what Kim and Lee (2010) points out. As stated in
Kim and Lee (2010), the desire to enter elite universities in the hierarchical higher
education system may have created a strong demand for this industry.
Korean, English, and Mathematics are three primary subjects of private tutor-
ing. In secondary education, more than 91% of expenditure for academic purposes
was for those three subjects. Given that academic private tutoring is designed to
help students achieve better academic outcomes, this is not surprising. Further-
more, the ultimate goal of seeking good academic outcomes in secondary school is
to be admitted to prestigious universities. Even though there are various types of
admission processes, one of the most important component is the College Scholastic
Ability Test that high school seniors take. As of 2003 (when the data came from),
this national level test consisted of 5 sections: Korean, English, Mathematics, Social
Studies/Science, and the Second Foreign Languages. But because 280 points out of
the total 400 points were assigned to Korean, English, and Mathematics, it is there-
fore natural for students to focus on these “major” subjects in order to achieve their
ultimate goal.
The most popular type of private tutoring, based on the expenditure, is attending
privately-run after-school institutes (Hakwon), followed by one-to-one or group tutor-
7
ing. These two types make up more than 97% of secondary education expenditures.
Hakwons alone make up almost 70% of secondary education expenditures. As of the
2017 Statistical Yearbook of Education, there are about 40,000 Hakwons and about
150,000 people are employed by Hakwons. Teachers employed by Hakwons instruct
their specialized subjects in the lecture rooms of the Hakwons. Students choose their
preferred Hakwon based on the teachers, location, schedule, and fees. In addition,
exchanging information about Hakwons among friends in school may be natural, so
there can be an overlap of classmates at Hakwons and school.
1.2.2 The Data
The data set used in this paper is the Korean Youth Panel Survey (hereafter, KYPS).
The data set was collected by the National Youth Policy Institute, a government-
funded research institute, to study a variety of topics related to adolescence. KYPS
consists of two panels, one for elementary school and the other for middle school.
This paper uses the middle school panel, because the elementary school panel does
not have some essential variables, such as a student’s academic ranking in a class at
the first wave. The first wave of the middle school panel was conducted in 2003, and
the survey continued until 2008.
The sampling procedure of KYPS is important in the context of this paper, be-
cause it provides a good opportunity to study peer effects. The initial sample surveyed
a selected set of 3,449 students, attending their second year of the middle school in
2003, and their parents. The sampling procedure is a stratified multi-stage cluster
sampling. First, the institution allocated target numbers of students across regions,
based on the distribution of students across those regions.9 All regions in Korea,
9Twelve regions were used in the survey. They are Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju,
Daejeon, Ulsan, Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Jeolla, and Gyeongsang.
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except Jeju Island, were subject to the survey. Second, the target numbers of schools
across the regions were decided, based on the target numbers of students across re-
gions, which were decided in the previous step. Third, schools were randomly selected
within each region. Lastly, students of selected schools were randomly selected. The
process of selecting students is especially noteworthy. In selected schools, a whole
class was selected and all students attending the class were surveyed. This is an im-
portant feature that can help researchers analyze peer effect. In addition, based on
the fact that other classmates’ socio-economic variables are available in the data, it
is also possible to define “peer” in many alternative ways and explore the potential
differences in the effects.
In this paper, the first two waves of KYPS are used. In the first survey, as
explained above, all students attending the same school are classmates. It means
that they share the same class schedule, teachers (both a homeroom teacher and
instructors), and other class environments during their academic year. When they
entered their third year of middle school, their classes were reassigned, so from the
second wave on, they may not be classmates anymore. Hence, by using the first two
waves, I am able to see the effect of classmates’ behavior (related to private tutoring)
in the first wave on a student’s behavior in the second wave.
KYPS asked a variety of questions about their school life, personality, academic
performance, and family background. One of main variables of interest is the use of
private tutoring. The survey collected information about the use of private tutoring
by students by asking various questions. I construct the measure by using average
weekly hours of private tutoring for three main subjects: Korean, English, and Math-
ematics.10 The definition of private tutoring used in the survey includes different
10As noted above, the three subjects compose most of the expenditures for private tutoring.
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types of services, such as one-to-one tutoring, group tutoring, attending private in-
stitutions, online tutoring, and overseas study.11 After constructing this measure, I
am able to calculate a peer-level variable. I define “peer” of a student as his or her
classmates, with one additional criterion. Based on the amounts of household income,
I create ranking of the income level for each class, then I label student B as student
A’s peer if student B’s income ranking is not more or less than 15 compared to A’s
ranking. This criterion is reasonable if students are more likely to have friends who
have similar socio-economic background, as pointed out in Mayer and Puller (2008).12
Variables related to cognitive and non-cognitive skills are also important in this
study. I generally follow Sarzosa and Urzu´a (2015) because they use the same data
set to study bullying in the context of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. I construct
three variables of cognitive skills: ranking in a classroom, ranking in a school, and
subjective evaluation of performance in Korean, Social Science, Mathematics, and
Science. Variables of ranking are directly collected from the survey. For the sub-
jective evaluation, students answered a question asking how good they are in each
subject, on a 1 to 5 scale. For non-cognitive skills, as Sarzosa and Urzu´a (2015) does,
I construct three indices, which consist of locus of control, self-esteem, and irrespon-
sibility. Students answered multiple questions regarding each index using a 1 to 5
scale. The full list of questions is in Section 1.7.1.
To construct the final set of observations, I drop observations that are missing any
values for all variables mentioned above plus household income and father’s years of
11Unfortunately, the information on the usage is not available for each type of service. By
dropping outliers (top 1% and bottom 1% in the expenditure), I may expect to drop observations
using very heterogeneous service, such as an overseas study.
12Fifteen is an arbitrary number. Hence, I perform the analysis by using other numbers and
discuss them in Section 1.5. An alternative definition is also discussed.
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education, which are also used in the analysis. I also drop observations with top 1%
or bottom 1% values of household income, the use of private tutoring, or monthly
expenditure for private tutoring. The final data set has 1,686 observations. Table 1.1
shows the summary statistic of the basic characteristics.
Table 1.1 shows that students use private tutoring much more in English and
Mathematics, compared to Korean. It may reflect the fact that most students feel
comfortable studying Korean because it is their mother language. The table also
shows that they are less likely to use private tutoring when they are in the third year
of middle school. A possible explanation is that they may learn some “study skills”
by using the service in the prior year, so some of them may stop using the service in
the second wave. It is also possible that students have less incentive to use private
tutoring during their third year of middle school, compared during their second year.
This may be the case if a student updates their information based on the academic
performance of each test. For example, a student may aim to be admitted by a
selective high school. However, if he realizes his cumulative performance up to his
second year was not enough to be admitted, he may stop further investment in private
tutoring. One more noticeable thing is that students’ fathers generally have higher
education levels compared to the mothers, which is not an uncommon phenomenon
in other developing countries.13
During the process of constructing the final set of observations, substantial num-
bers of observations are lost. The main reason for this loss is missing values, especially
variables about academic ranking (719 observations). To check if this loss creates a
significant change in the characteristics of the sample, I attach another table, Ta-
13e.g., “Record share of wives are more educated than their husbands”, an article published in
2014 states that share of couples in which the wife is more educated became greater than the share
of couples where the husband is more educated for the first time in 2012 in the United States.
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ble 1.2. It shows the same demographic variables with the 719 observations who
failed to report their ranking. To create Table 1.2, observations are dropped if they
have one of the following conditions: they do not live with their parents, or they do
not participate in the second wave. Also excluded are the top 1% and the bottom 1%
in terms of household income, usage of private tutoring, and monthly expenditure in
private tutoring. Mean values of demographic variables, in Table 1.2, do not differ
a lot compared to those in Table 1.1, but observations have slightly worse condition
in terms of socio-economic variables, such as household income. It is also noticeable
that the 719 observations devoted less time to private tutoring, even though the dif-
ference is not large. Given the intuition that wealth and the use of private tutoring
are positively related, this is not surprising.
1.3 Estimation
1.3.1 Empirical Setup
1.3.1.1 Production Functions
The ultimate goal of this paper is to estimate two human capital production functions,
cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills, in the context of private tutoring. To allow
possible non-linearity of functions and complementarities among factors, I adopt non-
linear CES-type production functions (used in Cunha et al. (2010) and Attanasio
et al. (2017)). By adopting the CES functional form, it is not required to impose
unnecessary and strong assumptions before the estimation. A parameter in the CES
functional form is linked to a functional form and the relationship among factors, so
a proper functional form is decided by the estimated parameter. Given the data, I
study the production functions between the two periods, the second and third years
of middle school.
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The two functions are expressed as the following:
θCi,2 = [γ
C
C (θ
C
i,1)
ρC + γCNC(θ
NC
i,1 )
ρC + γCP (Pi,2)
ρC ]
1
ρC exp(γC + uCi,2), (1.1)
θNCi,2 = [γ
NC
C (θ
C
i,1)
ρNC + γNCNC (θ
NC
i,1 )
ρNC + γNCP (Pi,2)
ρNC ]
1
ρNC exp(γNC + uNCi,2 ), (1.2)
where θC is a latent variable of cognitive skills, θNC is a latent variable of non-cognitive
skills, and P is a variable of the usage of private tutoring.14 uC and uNC are random
error terms. The two equations depict the process of accumulating human capital
from the first period to the second period. Each type of skill is a function of previous
skills, including the other type, the use of private tutoring, and a TFP term, which
consists of a constant and a random error term. The coefficients with γ notation are
called share parameters and related to the share of a corresponding production factor.
The summation of γCs and γ
NC
s are set to one, where s = {C,NC, P}.
The above non-linear form allows for potential relationships among factors, which
depends on the values of ρ. The value of ρ determines the elasticity of substitution,
which is 1
1−ρ , among factors. If ρ is equal to one, the function has a linear form, which
means that factors are perfect substitutes. It means that the level of the previous
stock of skills can be easily replaced by one factor of investment, private tutoring.
If ρ is equal to zero, the functional form will be the Cobb-Douglas type. If ρ is a
very small negative number, it is extremely difficult to catch-up the lack of previous
skills by investing more for private tutoring. Hence, the value of ρ has an economic
implication in the sense that ρ tells us how easy (or difficult) it is to narrow the gap
caused by differences in the amount of early investment for human capital.
14Pi,2 is a variable of average use of private tutoring during the previous year up until the date
of interview.
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As pointed out by Attanasio et al. (2017), there are two major obstacles that
prevent researchers from estimating the two functions directly using the data. First,
two error terms, uC and uNC , may be correlated with Pi,2, the usage of private
tutoring, which is obviously not randomly decided. Second, some of the variables are
unobservable. To deal with them, I use the same methodology used in Attanasio et al.
(2017). To address potential endogeneity, I adopt the control function approach. The
following section provides details of the estimation. To recover unobservable skills,
I use the latent factor model, which allows researchers to extract information about
unobservable variables from observable measures.
1.3.1.2 The Function of Private Tutoring: Peer Effect and the Control
Function
The control function approach is used to deal with potential endogeneity. Pi,2 can be
correlated with uC and uNC for various reasons. For example, adverse health shock
may directly affect both cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Parents and students also
observe the negative health shock and are able to increase the use of private tutoring,
in order to offset the expected negative effect of the health shock. To apply the
control function approach, I estimate the regression of private tutoring. By including
the instrumental variables in this regression, I can use the control function approach
by including the residuals from this regression in the regression of (1.1) and (1.2).
For the regression of private tutoring, I assume the linear function of log(Pi,2).
log(Pi,2) = β1 + β2log(θ
C
i,1) + β3log(θ
NC
i,1 ) + β4log(Zi,1) + β5log(PEERi,1) + vi,2,
(1.3)
where Zi,1 is i’s residual from the regression of i’s household income on i’s father’s
years of education and PEERi,1 is the average use of private tutoring of i’s peers.
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The control function approach requires instrumental variables that are not in-
cluded in (1.1) and (1.2) but are included in (1.3). Instrumental variables must affect
the endogeneous variable and not be correlated with error terms in production func-
tions. Peer behavior from previous period may affect use of private tutoring in the
next period if there exists a peer effect, which is also a question this paper addresses.
Arguably, peer behavior should not be related to the current random shocks or ex-
cluded variables because peers decide their behavior mainly based on their personal
situations. Z may affect usage directly because income changes the budget constraints
of households. In addition, Z is a part of household income, which is not explained
by the father’s human capital. Hence, it may reflect the economic performance of the
firms where the parents are working. It is possible that the parents may change labor
supply after observing shocks in the production functions. However, Z is observed
at the first period, so it may be reflected in the stocks of human capital at the first
period, which are included in (1.3).
The endogeneity of Pi,2 in the main specifications is equivalent to saying that vi,2
is correlated to uC or uNC . Imposing both uCi,2 = φCvi,2+ηi,2 and u
NC
i,2 = φNCvi,2+i,2
and including vi,2 in the two main non-linear regression equations allow for the use of
the standard Non-linear Least Squares (NLS) procedure to estimate our parameters
of interest. In practice, vi,2 is not observable, so the residuals from (1.3) is included
as the alternative.
1.3.1.3 The Latent Factor Model
Another issue is the existence of unobservable variables in the production functions.
Following Attanasio et al. (2017), I use multiple observable variables (also called
measurements) that are potentially related to the unobservable variables with mea-
surement error. After estimating the distributions of the measurements, the equa-
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tions that link the unobservable variables with measurements are used to estimate
the distributions of unobservable variables. From the estimated distributions of un-
observable variables, I draw the synthetic data set and use the data set to estimate
(1.1) and (1.2).
I adopt the following relationship between an unobservable variable and the mul-
tiple observable variables.15
mj,k,t = µj,k,t + λj,1,tlog(θ
C
t ) + λj,2,tlog(θ
NC
t ) + j,k,t, (1.4)
where mj,k,t is the j
th measure of kth unobservable variables at time t. As shown in
the literature (for example, Carneiro et al. (2003)), identifying parameters in (1.4)
requires a number of conditions. I adopt the following restrictions for parameters
and variables. First, normalization of λ is required, which is referred to as factor
loading. Normalization plays an important role because it provides a reference point
of scale to unobservable factors. I set the factor loading of a specific measure of
each unobservable variable to 1. The factor loading of academic ranking in a class
is normalized for cognitive skills, and the factor loading of the index of locus of
control is normalized for non-cognitive skills. Second, setting up the location is also
required. I assume that the mean values of the log of unobservable variables are
zero. Third, there must be additional restriction on λ. For example, it is not possible
to identify the system if I allow both factors to have an effect on all measures. I
assume that academic ranking is affected only by cognitive skills, but subjective
evaluation is affected by both cognitive and non-cognitive skills.16 Fourth, dependence
15The complete list of variables is in Section 1.7.2.
16The assumptions may be strong. For example, Heckman et al. (2011) mentions that academic
achievement depends not only on cognitive skills but also non-cognitive skills.
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of error terms, j,k,t, must be limited. The most restrictive assumption is imposing
independence among error terms, but I adopt a relaxed assumption in the main
specification. In the estimation, I allow two error terms of the same measure to have
intertemporal correlation. For example, it is possible that 1,1,1 is correlated to 1,1,2.
Lastly, j,k,t and log(θ) are assumed to be independent.
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There are three observable variables included in the estimation process. These
variables are considered as observed without error. The equation below represents
the case of mo, an observable variable.
mo = µo + λolog(ηo), (1.5)
where λo = 1 and log(ηo) is a demeaned version of the observable variable.
The following equations, expressed as matrices, are the summary of the system of
measurements.
M = µ+
15×7
Λ ×
7×1
Ω +, (1.6)
where
Ω = [log(θC1 ) log(θ
NC
1 ) log(θ
C
2 ) log(θ
NC
2 ) log(Pi,2) log(PEERi,1) log(Zi,1)]
′.
Ω represents a vector of unobservable variables and observable variables that are
used in the estimation of (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3). Ω includes 4 unobservable and 3
observable variables. The first two variables are cognitive and non-cognitive skills at
wave 1. The next two variables are cognitive and non-cognitive skills at wave 2. The
last three observable variables are (demeaned) the use of private tutoring, the peer
use of private tutoring, and the residuals from the regression of household income on
17The last two assumptions may be strong, but have been imposed in the previous literature
widely (Sarzosa (2017), Attanasio et al. (2017)).
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the fathers’ years of education (Z in (1.3).). Λ is a 15 by 7 matrix, which consists
of λ parameters in (1.4) and (1.5). Elements in Λ represent the relationship between
measurements and corresponding variables.
The number of equations in the above expression is 15, and each equation cor-
responds to an observable measure. The list of measures (observable variables) for
each factor (unobservable variables) is in Section 1.7.2. The first three equations are
about measures for cognitive skills at the first wave. The next three equations are
about measures for non-cognitive skills at the first wave. The next six equations are
for the same measures mentioned above at the second wave. The last three equations
are about observable variables.
(1.6) is used to construct moment conditions, which connect moments of measures
with moments of unobservable variables. These moment conditions are used to esti-
mate the distribution of unobservable and observable variables used for the regression,
along with other parameters, such as λ and variance of . Details are explained in
Section 1.3.2.
1.3.2 Estimation - A Three-Step Procedure
There are three steps for the estimation procedure. First, parameters that define the
distribution of observable variables (also called as measures) are estimated. Second,
based on the moment equations, which link observable variables with unobservable
variables, parameters that define the distribution of unobservable variables are esti-
mated through minimum distance estimation. The last step is drawing a synthetic
data set, including unobservable variables, from the estimated distribution in the sec-
ond step. With the synthetic data set, the regression equations (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3)
can be estimated by the least squares estimation.
Following Attanasio et al. (2017) and Sarzosa and Urzu´a (2015), I assume that
18
Ω, the observable and unobservable variables used for the regression (1.1), (1.2), and
(1.3), follows a mixture of two normal distributions. The important advantage of
using the mixture of normal is its flexibility compared to simpler distributions, such
as a normal distribution. For example, a normal distribution restricts the elasticity
of substitution, because normality means various inputs of human capital production
functions are perfect substitutes. The mixture of normal distributions of Ω means,
by a standard convolution argument, M , also follows the same type of distribution
because  follows a multinomial distribution.
1.3.2.1 Step 1: Estimating the Distribution of Observable Variables
The first step of estimation is obtaining the estimators of “reduced-form parame-
ters”, mean vectors, and variance-covariance matrices of M , which are the observable
variables in the data. By imposing the assumption of a mixture of two normal distri-
butions, it is required to estimate mean vectors and variance-covariance matrices of
two components of M with the mixture weight τ . Following Attanasio et al. (2017),
I use the EM-algorithm for the estimation.
To start, observations in the data set are divided into two “clusters”, based on
K-means clustering. Initially, the program randomly chooses a point, and picks an-
other point randomly. When the computer chooses the second point, the selection
is based on the distance from the initially chosen point. The two points are initial
two “centroid” locations of clusters. Then, the program assigns each individual ob-
servation to one of clusters by distance. After this initial assignment, the program
calculates the average value of members in each cluster, and the two average values
becomes the updated “centroid” locations. The above process is repeated until the
assignment becomes stable.
From each cluster, the sample mean vector and the sample variance-covariance
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matrix are calculated. With the initial value of mixture weight, 0.5, they form the set
of initial values of EM-algorithm. Specifically, the goal of the first step is estimating
the following likelihood function, to estimate parameters of the distribution of M .
L = ΠNi=1(τf(Mi, µ
A
M ,Σ
A
M) + (1− τ)f(Mi, µBM ,ΣBM)), (1.7)
where f is a multinomial density function.
Note that (1.7) is a non-linear function, so maximization is computationally de-
manding. To address this issue, a new latent variable, ∆, is defined. With this new
variable, instead of (1.7), the below log-likelihood function is maximized.
logL = ΣNi=1[∆ilogf(Mi, µ
A
M ,Σ
A
M)
+ (1−∆i)logf(Mi, µBM ,ΣBM) + ∆i log τ + (1−∆i) log (1− τ)],
(1.8)
where ∆i = 1 if Mi is from the first component of a mixture of two normal dis-
tributions. ∆i is unobservable, so it is replaced by its conditional expected value,
E[∆i | τ, µ,Σ,Mi]. E[∆i | τ, µ,Σ,Mi] is equal to Prob(∆i = 1 | τ, µ,Σ,Mi),
which is the probability of Mi from the first component. In EM algorithm litera-
ture, the relative density (responsibility) is used for this probability and written as
γˆi =
τfA(Mi)
τfA(Mi) + (1− τ)fB(Mi) .
The “initial” values of parameters explained above produce “initial” value of γˆ
and subsequently estimates τ , µ, and Σ. The updated τ , µ, and Σ again produce the
updated γˆ. The process is repeated until the convergence criteria is reached.18 Once
the convergence is achieved, the finally updated parameters form “reduced-form”
parameters in the next step for minimum distance estimation.
18In this paper, norm distance between two vectors of parameters, from the final two steps, is
required to be smaller than 0.00005 for the convergence.
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1.3.2.2 Step 2: Estimating the Distribution of Unobservable Variables
From (1.6), it is possible to derive several moment conditions, which can be used
for the estimation through minimum distance criterion. Section 1.7.3 includes a full
list of these moment conditions. The moment conditions include both parameters
from M , which are “reduced-form parameters,” and parameters from Ω, which are
“structural parameters.” It is easy to observe that the number of moment conditions,
Section 1.7.3, is greater than the number of parameters to be estimated, and that
some of these conditions can be combined. As a result, the objective function to be
minimized is summarized as the following three matrices-level equations.
τ(µAM − µBM) + ΛµB = 0
ΛΣAΛ
′
+ Σ − ΣAM = 0
ΛΣBΛ
′
+ Σ − ΣBM = 0,
(1.9)
where µA, µB, ΣA,ΣB, Σ, and Λ are parameters to be estimated.
It is known that minimization using the optimal weight matrix, based on the
variance-covariance matrix of reduced form estimators, produces more efficient esti-
mators than those from the identity matrix. However, the validity of optimal weight
matrix relies on the credibility of the (estimated) weight matrix. Unfortunately, the
sample size of the data set is relatively small, compared to the number of the reduced
form parameters.19 Hence, to prevent the danger of using a non-credible weight ma-
trix, I adopt the identity matrix in the estimation.
19The number of observation is 1,686 and the number of reduced-form parameters is 271 (1 for
τ , 15 for µAM , 15 for µ
B
M , 120 for Σ
A
M , and Σ
B
M ).
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1.3.2.3 Step 3: Regression Analysis with the Synthetic Data
The previous step provides information about the distribution of unobservable vari-
ables. Four logs of unobservable variables and 3 observable variables follow a mixture
of two multinomial distributions, g(Ω) = τφA(Ω;µ
A,ΣA) + (1 − τ)φB(Ω;µB,ΣB),
where g is the probability density function of Ω, and φ is the probability density
function of multinomial distribution. From g(Ω), 1,686 observations are randomly
drawn.
With the synthetic data set, 3 linear and non-linear regression models, (1.1), (1.2),
and (1.3), are estimated. First, regression of the use of private tutoring, (1.3), is es-
timated using the standard linear least squares regression. From (1.3), residuals are
produced and included when (1.1) and (1.2) are estimated in order to address endo-
geneity. Then (1.1) and (1.2) are estimated by non-linear least squares regression.20
Standard errors of estimated parameters are found with bootstrap. Initially, the
original data set is divided into two components by K-means algorithm. Then I apply
bootstrap sampling for each component of the data set. For each bootstrap data set,
all three steps explained above are performed and produce estimates of parameters.
The baseline number of bootstrap repetition is 3,000 in this paper.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 The Measurement System
Variables used in the estimation differ in terms of their scale. As explained earlier,
there are 3 measures for each unobservable variables, so there are a total of 12 observ-
20In the algorithm, search for ρ close to zero is done with a first-order Taylor series approximation
(Kmenta approximation, Henningsen and Henningsen (2012)).
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able measures for 4 unobservable variables. There are 3 more observable variables
included in the regression: the use of private tutoring, the residuals of household
income regression, and the peer use of private tutoring.
Among the total of 15 variables, the first 12 variables have their upper bounds
because of the formation of the data. “Ranking” variable is calculated by a
b
100, where
a is a student’s rank and b is the total number of a class (or a school). Hence, the
upper bound is 100. “Subjective Evaluation” variable is based on 4 questions that
cover 4 important subjects: Korean, Social Science, Mathematics, and Science. For
each subject, the question asks how students evaluate their performance relative to
classmates by selecting a number from 1 to 5. “1” corresponds to the worst and “5”
corresponds to the best in terms of performance. Then summarizing the responses
across the 4 subjects produces a value between 4 and 20, so 20 is the upper bound. All
“index” variables regarding non-cognitive skills are defined similarly. Each index is
based on three different questions listed in Section 1.7.1. Similar to the self-evaluation
questions, each question asks students to choose a number from 1 to 5. “1” indicates
that students strongly disagree with the statement and “5” indicates that students
strongly agree with the statement. Summarizing the responses across 3 questions for
each index produces a value between 3 and 15, so 15 is the upper bound.
The remaining 3 observable variables differ in the perspective of scale. The first
is the use of private tutoring, which is defined as the average weekly hours devoted to
participating in private tutoring for Korean, English, and Mathematics. Peer usage
is the average usage of private tutoring, calculated from each student’s classmates.
The last is the residual from the regression of household income. These 3 variables
are not designed to be fitted with specific intervals unlike the 12 variables mentioned
before.
The fact that the K-means algorithm uses absolute value of distance between
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observations implies usefulness for re-scaling. This is because some variables may
dominate the algorithm just because they have a wider range of scale, not because
they are more important than others. In the process of re-scaling, variables with
pre-defined upper bounds are divided by their upper bounds, so they have new upper
bounds of 1. Other variables are divided by the difference between observed maxi-
mum values and observed minimum values in the data. Then all the variables have
comparable scales. It is true that the scale explained here is arbitrary. In Section 1.5,
I check whether the main results are robust to the scale.
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics for these 15 variables.21 The mean values
of ranking variables are slightly skewed. This means that students not doing well
academically were dropped from the sample more often than those doing well. As
discussed earlier (Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), dropped observations had less favorable
socio-economic conditions, which may be related to worse academic performance.
However, arguably, the loss of observations does not create a huge difference based on
the two earlier mentioned tables. In addition, observations included in the estimation
still cover a wide range of academic performance.
It is noticeable from Table 1.3 that students give slightly positive answers to sub-
jective questions on average. The average values of variables about subjective eval-
uation and two positive personalities, Locus of Control and Self-Esteem, are slightly
higher than 0.6, but this is not the case for variables about Irresponsibility.22 Students
weakly disagree they are irresponsible, or impulsive, people on average.
The last part of Table 1.3 introduces additional information about the usage of
21For reference, I attach the statistics for the variables of the use of private tutoring before
re-scaling.
22The lower bounds are 0.2 by construction (as mentioned in the above paragraph).
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private tutoring. For the purpose of this paper, it is ideal to have enough student-
level variations in the use of private tutoring, because this paper aims to capture
the effect of differences in the use of private tutoring. To examine this issue, I check
whether two potential threats appear from the data. First, it is possible that being
in a different school explains most of the variation. The observed variation can just
stem from differences in school environments, such as neighborhoods. Second, it is
also possible that the variation in private tutoring simply comes from students not
using private tutoring. It means that it is difficult to distinguish the effect from the
extensive and intensive margins of private tutoring. The table shows that most of the
variation arises within schools, so indeed the variation is from differences in individual
behaviors. In addition, the table confirms that a substantial part of variation is from
the intensive margin, because the variation calculated excluding students not using
private tutoring is still substantially large.
Estimated values of factor loadings, Λ, are reported in Table 1.4. As expected,
higher cognitive skills are related to lower values of the ranking variables, which mean
better academic outcomes. Cognitive skills also help students to positively evaluate
their academic performance. This is intuitive because objective outcomes, such as
ranking, are highly likely to impact how students judge their own performance. At
the same time, students’ evaluations of academic performance are also positively
affected by their non-cognitive skills. This relationship is not surprising because non-
cognitive skills may affect how each person shape his or her attitude. Students giving
positive evaluations of the self may also give positive evaluations of their academic
performance.
Regarding measurements of non-cognitive skills, it is noticeable that signs of load-
ings depend on the type of indices. Non-cognitive skills make students more active
in their lives (Locus of Control) and make them evaluate themselves as better people
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(Self-Esteem). In contrast, the signs of loadings about the last index, Irresponsibility,
are negative. This means that non-cognitive skills can help students be more patient
and less impulsive.
There is another important parameter, the mixing parameter τ , related to the
distribution of Ω. The mixing parameter is a value of weight of one of two normal
distributions that consist of a mixture of Normal distribution. If this is zero or
one, assuming a mixture of Normal distribution would be unnecessary. However, the
estimated value of τ confirms this is not the case. Hence, to consider a more flexible
distribution, such as a mixture of Normal, is important.
Table 1.5 shows the estimated values of the signal-to-noise ratio. They are calcu-
lated by
skj =
λ2j,kV ar(Ωk)
λ2j,kV ar(Ωk) + V ar(j)
, (1.10)
where j is the index for measures, and k is the index for unobservable variables.
Basically, this ratio tells us how much of the variation of a measure is explained
by variation of a corresponding factor. The table shows that measures for cognitive
skills are much more informative than those for non-cognitive skills. For variables of
academic ranking, more than three quarters of their variation are explained by the
variation of cognitive skills. However, only 10%, more or less, of the variation of the
indices are explained by non-cognitive skills. It may be possible that the respondents’
feelings at the moment of the survey have substantial impacts on the answers of
the indices variables. Then the variation of the indices variables may be largely
affected by a random shock. Overall, it suggests that treating observable variables
as skills themselves is a very strong assumption. This fact highlights the importance
of considering the unobservable nature of skills, especially when the analysis is about
non-cognitive skills.
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1.4.2 Regression of Private Tutoring
Table 1.6 shows results of regression (1.3). This regression model shows factors that
affect the use of private tutoring. There are three statistically significant coefficients,
including two instrumental variables. First, a 1% increase in cognitive skills at the
previous period cause a 0.225% increase in the use of private tutoring. This posi-
tive relationship between cognitive skills and the usage may be explained by several
reasons. For example, if the effect of private tutoring on future outcomes, such as
scores of future exams, is an increasing function with the current level of cognitive
skills, this relationship is natural. As an alternative explanation, it may be the case
that an increase in observable outputs is more valuable for high-performing students
than low-performing students. Then the positive estimate makes sense even if there
is no heterogeneous effect of private tutoring on future outcomes. One implication
we can draw from the observed coefficient is that high-performing students from low-
income households can have difficulty competing with their classmates, especially if
the correlation between the use of private tutoring and outputs is high.23 Second,
as expected by household budget constraint, household income has a positive effect
on the usage. A 1% increase in household income causes about a 0.177% increase
in usage. This positive effect is also reported by other research (Tansel and Bircan
(2006)). Naturally, it can strengthen the inequality in academic performance between
students from high-income households and low-income households. Third, usage is
significantly affected by the behavior of peer students and the elasticity is 0.129. It
may be reasonable in that adolescents tend to be affected by their friends’ behaviors,
which is consistent with Gaviria and Raphael (2001). Combined with other coeffi-
cients, it implies that students in a relatively wealthy area may be pressured to use
23Dang (2007) reports a significant impact of private tutoring on academic performance.
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private tutoring more strongly, because their peers are more likely to use the service.
This peer effect can intensify the inequality between wealthy regions and poor re-
gions in terms of students’ observable outcomes. In addition, poor students may face
difficulty to catching up to their peers in this situation.
1.4.3 Regression of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 show results from regression (1.1) and (1.2). Note that the
elasticity of substitution ρC and ρNC are statistically zero. The estimates support the
Cobb-Douglas type functional form of (1.1) and (1.2), which causes the coefficients
to be interpreted as elasticity.24
Table 1.7 reports both strongly positive self-productivity and cross-productivity
(Cunha et al. (2010)). Specifically, a 1% increase in lagged cognitive skills causes
about a 0.8% increase in cognitive skills of the next period, which shows high
self-productivity of cognitive skills. The cross-productivity is lower than the self-
productivity, but certainly exists. The elasticity of the lagged non-cognitive skills is
about 0.27. However, surprisingly, private tutoring does not help the accumulation
of cognitive skills. Table 1.8 shows that positive self-productivity of non-cognitive
skills is observed, but the estimates do not show significant cross-productivity of non-
cognitive skills. The elasticity of lagged non-cognitive skills is again very high. A 1%
increase in lagged non-cognitive skills causes about a 0.88% increase in non-cognitive
skills of the next period. Again, private tutoring does not help the accumulation.
The above finding about self-productivity and cross-productivity is consistent with
Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) in that they also report self-
24I estimate (1.1) and (1.2) with the Cobb-Douglas functional forms, by imposing ρC = 0 and
ρNC = 0 directly. I report the results in Table 1.24 and Table 1.25. There is no meaningful difference
in both estimates and their standard errors, compared to the results in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8.
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productivity for both skills and the cross-productivity channel from non-cognitive
skills to cognitive skills but find none in the direction of cognitive skills to non-
cognitive skills. However, there are also other studies that report different estimates.
Helmers and Patnam (2011) (Indian data) reports the existence of cross-productivity
for both skills by using data. There can be a lot of explanations for the difference.
The difference between developing and developed countries may create inconsistency.
It is also possible that difference in timing results in the difference. Helmers and
Patnam (2011) estimates the production functions for people between 8 and 12 years
of age. In this paper, although the exact age depends on the date of birth, students
in the data were roughly between 14 and 15 years of age. Coneus et al. (2012) reports
that cross-productivity of cognitive skills on non-cognitive skills become insignificant
as people get older.
Self-productivity in both cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills implies that early
investment has the large advantage in the future accumulation of human capital. Al-
though this paper cannot exclude the existence of other effective types of investment,
which can help the accumulation at later stage, the results imply that it may not be
effective to catch-up lagged development of human capital at later stages by spending
large amounts of money on private tutoring. Private tutoring cannot even help the
development of cognitive skills. The ineffectiveness of private tutoring also suggests
that this service may not be helpful to increase the total stock of human capital, even
though people spend substantial amounts of resources in this sector. It is not possible
to say that households need to stop using private tutoring, because tutoring can still
be helpful for students who want to achieve better observable outcomes. There the in-
vestment is still a rational choice because the observable outcomes may have positive
effects on later outputs, such as employment outcomes. However, if a government has
policy tools, such as the college admission system, which can decrease the usefulness
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of private tutoring or reduce the prices of private tutoring, these tools would improve
the efficiency of the distribution of resources.
1.5 Robustness Check
1.5.1 The Definition of “Peer”
The definition of “peer” in the main estimation that consists of students, ranked by
household income within the bound of 15 is chosen arbitrarily. I test whether change
in this definition create substantially different results. First, I try different values of
the bound. Second, I try a different concept of “peer.” In all cases, both the main
results and the results from robustness checks are consistent.
The value of bound in the main estimation is 15. It means that a student is sup-
posed to affect and be affected by classmates within 15 bounds from the perspective
of the use of private tutoring. I check whether different values of the bound create
substantially different results. If students strongly tend to interact with classmates
with similar household backgrounds, narrower bounds will be adequate. However,
if they interact regardless of their household backgrounds, to base the definition of
peer only on household income with tight bounds will not be a proper setup. For the
narrower bounds, I try 10, and for the wider bounds, I try 20. Table 1.9 is about
regression (1.3), and Table 1.10 is about regression (1.1) and (1.2). Both tables show
that a change in the width of the bound does not create substantial difference in the
results from the perspective of both coefficients and tests of significance.
On the other hand, the idea that students are more likely to be affected by other
students who have similar household income may be arguable. Alternatively, Ta-
ble 1.11 and Table 1.12 show results of the regression by applying a different criterion.
In these tables, ranking in classes is created by the students’ academic performance
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(tests), rather than by household income. This idea is still based on sorting behavior,
but ranking based on academic performance is more closely related to the ability of
potential friends, not their parents. If students observe their classmates’ ability and
build relationship, the definition of peer based on this alternative ranking will be a
better variable. I estimate the same regression models with a variety of bounds as
done in Table 1.9 and Table 1.10. Again, the estimates show that the main finding
is still very robust.
Overall, the results are not sensitive to both bounds and the alternative definition.
The robustness to bounds may suggest that students affect and are affected by all of
their classmates, not just a small subset of classmates. Combining the results, we can
interpret it as the non-existence of sorting behavior within a classroom. On the other
hand, it does not automatically mean that there is no sorting behavior for friendships
in general. This is because being in the same school itself may imply they are mostly
homogeneous in many dimensions, such as parental background.
1.5.2 Restrictions on Parameters
In the estimation process (Section 1.3.2), it is required to impose several restrictions
on (1.6) for identification. If changes in restrictions create substantial difference in
results, it will be difficult to argue that results are robust. Even though there is a
limit to allowing a variety of restrictions due to the identification issue, I try a few
more types of imposed restrictions and confirm that the main finding is robust to
different types of restrictions.
The imposed restrictions on (1.6) can be summarized by two parts. The first part
is on Λ. I test whether one additional restriction on an element of factor loading
creates substantial difference in results. The restriction is imposed for one of the
measures used for cognitive skills: the subjective evaluation variable. Students may
31
evaluate their academic performance differently with similar test scores, just because
they feel differently. I allow non-cognitive skills to affect the subjective evaluation
in the baseline specification but assume the effect as zero in the robustness check.
In other words, I check whether omitting a potentially important variable in the
measurement equations makes differences in main results. The second part is on
the variance-covariance matrix of . I use a tighter specification of this matrix by
imposing zero values for all non-diagonal elements, which means that all error terms
are mutually independent. This is a strong assumption. For example, a specific
type of random shock, such as negative shocks to health, must be intertemporally
independent. The purpose of this robustness check is to investigate whether different
structure of error terms can create substantial differences in results. To summarize,
it is possible to check 4 different specifications and the specifications are explained in
Section 1.7.4.
Table 1.13 and Table 1.14 report results from all three regression models, (1.1),
(1.2), and (1.3), under the three alternative specifications mentioned above. Esti-
mated coefficients and their standard errors from A,B, and C show that results are
similar to those from the main specification. The robustness shown here confirms the
two following arguments. First, the main results may not be sensitive to potentially
ignored variables in the empirical equations in (1.6). The error terms include all omit-
ted factors affecting corresponding measures. In specification A and C, non-cognitive
skills are omitted, for the subjective evaluation variables. It is confirmed that it does
not change the main results. Second, the main results are robust to the structure
of error terms. The structure of error terms of the main specification may still be
too restrictive, due to the identification issue. But this simplification may not create
changes in the main results as suggested from results of specification A and B.
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1.5.3 Selection of Measures
The measures explained in Section 1.7.2 are selected in the baseline estimation be-
cause, arguably, it is reasonable to assume that these measures and unobserved factors
are related. However, there can exist concerns about whether the main finding is ro-
bust to the selection of measures. Although it is not possible to repeat the estimation
with a variety of sets of measures due to the data constraint, I perform the estima-
tion with two different sets of measures and provide the results in Table 1.15 and
Table 1.16. Section 1.7.5 shows these two sets of measures. In short, the main finding
is robust to the selection of measures.
Selection A includes only one of the ranking variables, the schoolwide ranking,
and split the subjective evaluation measure into two parts. The first part is the
average subjective evaluation of Korean and Social Science, and the second part is
the average subjective evaluation of Mathematics and Science. This set of measures
alleviates potential issues that can arise from a high correlation between two ranking
variables. In addition, it considers the possibility of heterogeneous factor loadings of
skills on the subjective evaluation of different subjects. For example, under this set of
measures, it is possible that the effect of cognitive skills on Mathematics is stronger
than the effect on Korean.
Selection B uses the variable of subjective evaluation constructed based on all 4
subjects as done in the baseline estimation. The school ranking variable is also used,
but the class ranking variable is replaced by a new variable. I regress the class ranking
on the school ranking and use the residuals of this regression instead of using the class
ranking variable itself. It means that I use only the extra portion of information of
the class ranking in Selection B, so this set of measures can deal with any potential
problem from using two very highly correlated measures.
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The results from both A and B confirm the main finding: private tutoring does
not help students improve their level of fundamental skills. It is certainly true that
there is a room for improvement in terms of measurements with a better data set.
Each measurement in this better data set can have original information, and the
measurements may not be highly correlated. However, this robustness check implies
that the main results may be still robust to the improvement of the data.
1.5.4 The Number of Bootstrapping
To derive the standard errors of the baseline estimation, I perform 3,000 bootstrap-
ping. Although this is not a small number, it is not obvious that this number is large
enough to stabilize the estimation. Hence, it is worth checking the results with dif-
ferent numbers of bootstrapping and confirming the robustness of the main findings
across these numbers. Table 1.17 and Table 1.18 show results from the three different
numbers of bootstrapping, 300, 2,000, and 4,000. The point estimates of significant
estimates are very similar across different numbers of bootstrapping, and there is no
change in the statistical significance of each coefficient.
1.5.5 Timing of Private Tutoring
For the baseline estimation, the use of private tutoring are based on the survey ques-
tions from the second wave. Students are asked about their average use of private
tutoring during the previous year up until the date of interview, so it is not possible
to know the exact amount of usage at a specific time. If the effect of private tutoring
appears slowly, the ineffectiveness observed in Section 1.4 may not be strong evidence
to argue that private tutoring is not effective for the production of human capital.
To check this lagging effect scenario, I estimate (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) by using the
use of private tutoring measured from the first wave and not from the second wave.
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One difference compared to the baseline case is that it is necessary to drop the peer
usage in (1.1). The dependent variable in (1.1) is the usage of private tutoring in the
first wave. This dependent variable affects peer behavior, which implies that the peer
usage is not an appropriate instrumental variable. The results from (1.1), (1.2), and
(1.3) are in Table 1.19 and Table 1.20. The estimates of human capital production
functions are similar to those from the baseline model. It suggests that the lagging
effect, at least for one year, does not exist. From (1.1), the positive effect of income
on the use of private tutoring is still observed. However, the effect of cognitive skills
on the use of private tutoring is not significant at the 10% level, unlike in the baseline
estimation. It may be possible that students react to their perception of skills by
changing the usage, but the response takes time. Overall, the potential issue of the
timing of measures does not affect the main finding of this paper.
1.5.6 Scale of Measurements
The scale of measurements used to produce the main results is somewhat arbitrary, so
I check if the main results are robust to one different scale of measurements: standard-
ized measurements. Standardized measurements convert all units of measurements
into z-scores, making interpretations easier. In terms of robustness, standardized mea-
sures produce different results when CES functions and Cobb-Douglas functions with
the constant returns to scale are applied. The results suggest that private tutoring is
effective to non-cognitive skills. However, I find that the restriction that the above
two types of functions have is not empirically supported when standardized measure-
ments are used. When I remove the restriction, the main result of non-effectiveness
of private tutoring stays the same.
Table 1.21 shows the results of first-stage regression (1.3). Compared to the results
from Table 1.6, it shows that coefficients change, but the significance and the direction
35
stay the same. The change in coefficients is natural because standardization changes
the units of measures and indirectly changes the units of the synthetic data set through
minimum distance estimation. This can be understood from (1.4) and the restriction
of factor loading. The first measurement of each factor has 1 as the coefficient of the
factor because of normalization. It means that the standard deviation of unobservable
factors are adjusted based on the scale of measurements. Note that the adjustment is
not a 1-to-1 relationship between a factor and the first measurement, because there
are other measurements and there are measurements related to more than one factor.
Table 1.22 is about the human capital production functions, (1.1) and (1.2). The main
differences in the results are from the regression of non-cognitive skills. Estimated
coefficients of private tutoring and residuals from (1.3) are now significant. Private
tutoring helps the accumulation of non-cognitive skills, but the residuals negatively
affect the accumulation. It may be the case that adverse shocks to non-cognitive
skills are positively related to the use of private tutoring. For example, students
and their parents may increase the use of private tutoring when they observe shocks
to mental health, in order to offset negative effects. As the estimated elasticity of
substitution from Table 1.22 is statistically zero, I also estimate (1.1) and (1.2) by
using the Cobb-Douglas formation. Table 1.23 includes results from Cobb-Douglas,
and this table shows that the results are consistent with Table 1.22.
The above results do not seem to be robust to the different scale, but there exists
one important fact that must be considered. Both (1.1) and (1.2) have a restriction,
γC + γNC + γP = 1. The restriction applies to both the CES and the Cobb-Douglas
formation. The estimation reported in this section has been done with this restriction.
I test whether the restriction empirically holds by using non-restricted Cobb-Douglas
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regressions,
log(θCi,2) = β
C
C log(θ
C
i,1) + β
C
NC log(θ
NC
i,1 ) + β
C
P log(Pi,2) + β
C + uCi,2, (1.11)
log(θNCi,2 ) = β
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C log(θ
C
i,1) + β
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NC log(θ
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i,1 ) + β
NC
P log(Pi,2) + β
NC + uNCi,2 , (1.12)
without imposing βC+βNC+βP = 1. Then I construct a test statistic:
bC+bNC+bP−1
SE(bC+bNC+bP )
,
where b represents the estimated β, and the mean and standard error are from boot-
strapping. The difference in the values of this test statistic, from (1.12), between the
main scale and standardized scale is large: -0.129 from the main scale and -1.418
from the standardized scale. These values suggest that, at 10% significance level,
both CES and Cobb-Douglas formation with the restriction are not proper empirical
equations when the standardized scale is applied.
Indeed, the difference in main results come from the above restriction. Table 1.26
and Table 1.27 compares the results from (1.11) and (1.12) for each scale. In both
types of scale, the main finding stays the same: both skills positively affect themselves
in next period, non-cognitive skills positively affect cognitive skills in the next period,
and there is no effect of private tutoring on either skill. Hence, I conclude that the
main finding is still robust to the different scale.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper estimates two human capital production functions, one for cognitive skills
and one for non-cognitive skills. By incorporating private tutoring in the functions, I
try to analyze the effects of private tutoring on the development of human capital. To
estimate these functions, I need to address two major issues, the endogeneity and the
existence of unobservable variables. I address the first issue with the control function
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approach by using peer usage and household budget as instrumental variables. The
second issue is dealt with using the latent factor model.
Results from the estimation show that private tutoring has no effect on human
capital accumulation, for both skills. It does not automatically mean that spending
substantial amounts of money on private tutoring is irrational behavior. This is
because private tutoring still can help students improve observable outcomes, such as
test scores. However, the large amounts of spending on private tutoring may not be
a desirable use of resources from the perspective of the society if the tutoring does
not help the production of human capital.
The results also show that there exists the peer effect on the use of private tutoring.
Students in different schools or classes may face different levels of peer pressure related
to the use of private tutoring because the demographics of peers differ. Based on the
finding, students in a relatively rich area (or a school) will face a larger peer effect. It
means that students with a lesser budget in a rich area or school may have difficulty
following their peers’ behavior.
Certainly, there are some limitations to the analysis in this paper. The first is
that, even if I satisfy the minimum restrictions of the latent factor model, the number
and type of measures are limited due to the data restriction. More diverse measures
are desirable in order to produce more reliable outcomes. Second, this paper analyses
only a specific time period, between the 8th grade and the 9th grade. The effect of
private tutoring can be heterogeneous across time periods, so I cannot exclude the
possibility of significant effects during other time periods. Lastly, this paper does not
address the potential heterogeneous effect across different demographic factors such
as gender, academic achievement of parents, and so on. These need to be studied in
future research.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Socio-Economic Variables (the Main Sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Weekly hours for Korean (Wave 1) 2.06 1.98
Weekly hours for English (Wave 1) 3.40 2.67
Weekly hours for Mathematics (Wave 1) 3.38 2.53
Weekly hours for Korean (Wave 2) 1.77 1.89
Weekly hours for English (Wave 2) 3.01 2.47
Weekly hours for Mathematics (Wave 2) 3.08 2.44
Monthly Expenditure for Private Tutoring (Wave 1) 25.81 19.27
Monthly Expenditure for Private Tutoring (Wave 2) 26.33 22.45
Dummy for Female 0.50 0.50
Years of Education of Father 13.47 2.80
Years of Education of Mother 12.31 2.49
Number of Older Sibling 0.56 0.67
Number of Younger Sibling 0.65 0.67
Monthly Household Income 295.60 144.28
Dummy for Homeownership 0.72 0.45
1 The monetary unit is 10,000 KRW.
2 The number of observation is 1,686. For the mother’s education variable, 1,669.
3 Years of education are calculated by a categorical question. I assign 0 for No
Schooling, 6 for finishing Elementary School, 9 for finishing Middle School, 12
for finishing High School, 16 for finishing College, 18 for finishing Master, 21 for
finishing Ph.D..
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Socio-Economic Variables (the Dropped Sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Weekly hours for Korean (Wave 1) 1.95 2.05
Weekly hours for English (Wave 1) 3.20 2.57
Weekly hours for Mathematics (Wave 1) 3.29 2.95
Weekly hours for Korean (Wave 2) 1.50 1.80
Weekly hours for English (Wave 2) 2.48 2.28
Weekly hours for Mathematics (Wave 2) 2.66 2.47
Monthly Expenditure for Private Tutoring (Wave 1) 24.74 19.93
Monthly Expenditure for Private Tutoring (Wave 2) 24.86 22.71
Dummy for Female 0.49 0.50
Years of Education of Father 13.30 2.93
Years of Education of Mother 12.27 2.49
Number of Older Sibling 0.51 0.64
Number of Younger Sibling 0.66 0.65
Monthly Household Income 284.78 153.37
Dummy for Homeownership 0.70 0.46
1 The monetary unit is 10,000 KRW.
2 The number of observation is 719. For the mother’s education variable, 716.
3 The same rule with Table 1.1 is applied to calculate years of education.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Variables used in the Estimation
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Academic Ranking in a Classroom (Wave 1) 0.41 0.27
Academic Ranking in a School (Wave 1) 0.38 0.26
Subjective Evaluation of Academic Performance (Wave 1) 0.65 0.15
Index: Locus of Control (Wave 1) 0.70 0.14
Index: Self-Esteem (Wave 1) 0.64 0.14
Index: Irresponsibility (Wave 1) 0.52 0.16
Academic Ranking in a Classroom (Wave 2) 0.38 0.26
Academic Ranking in a School (Wave 2) 0.37 0.26
Subjective Evaluation of Academic Performance (Wave 2) 0.65 0.15
Index: Locus of Control (Wave 2) 0.71 0.15
Index: Self-Esteem (Wave 2) 0.67 0.15
Index: Irresponsibility (Wave 2) 0.54 0.15
Use of Private Tutoring 0.31 0.24
Peer Use of Private Tutoring 0.69 0.15
Residuals of Regression of Income on Education (Father) -0.00 0.15
Reference for the Use of Private Tutoring (Before Re-scaling)
Use of Private Tutoring (Korean) 1.77 1.89
Use of Private Tutoring (English) 3.01 2.47
Use of Private Tutoring (Mathematics) 3.08 2.44
Peer Use of Private Tutoring (Korean) 2.05 0.60
Peer Use of Private Tutoring (English) 3.41 0.82
Peer Use of Private Tutoring (Mathematics) 3.39 0.83
Supplementary Information for the Variance of Use of Private Tutoring
Total SS 96.494
Between School SS 9.287
Within School SS 87.207
Usage of Private Tutoring (Excluding “0”) 0.40 0.19
1 The number of observation is 1,686.
2 “Peer” is defined as collection of classmates who are ranked by household income,
within 15 range.
3 The usage means hours devoted for the tutoring per week.
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Table 1.4: Estimated Factor Loading and Mixing Parameter
Components Measure Factor Estimates Bootstrapp SD
λ1,1 Ranking (Class)(1) C -1 ·
λ2,1 Ranking (School)(1) C -0.9791 0.0262
λ3,1 Sub.Eval(1) C 0.3226 0.0413
λ3,2 Sub.Eval(1) NC 0.8689 0.2624
λ4,2 Locus(1) NC 1 ·
λ5,2 Esteem(1) NC 1.0539 0.1490
λ6,2 Irresponsiblity(1) NC -0.9717 0.1591
λ7,3 Ranking (Class)(2) C -1 ·
λ8,3 Ranking (School)(2) C -0.9806 0.0211
λ9,3 Sub.Eval(2) C 0.3370 0.0473
λ9,4 Sub.Eval(2) NC 0.8331 0.3294
λ10,4 Locus(2) NC 1 ·
λ11,4 Esteem(2) NC 1.0072 0.1467
λ12,4 Irresponsiblity(2) NC -0.8871 0.1745
λ13,5 Use of P. Tutoring(2) O 1 ·
λ14,6 Peer Use(1) O 1 ·
λ15,7 Residuals(1) O 1 ·
τ · · 0.4268 0.1471
1 λ1,1, λ4,2, λ7,3, λ10,4, λ13,5, λ14,6, and λ15,7 are not estimated.
2 C: Cognitive, NC: Non-Cognitive, O: Observable
Table 1.5: Estimated Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Measure Ratio
Academic Ranking in a Classroom (Wave 1) 0.8477
Academic Ranking in a School (Wave 1) 0.8015
Subjective Evaluation of Academic Performance (Wave 1) 0.2777
Index: Locus of Control (Wave 1) 0.1142
Index: Self-Esteem (Wave 1) 0.1315
Index: Irresponsibility (Wave 1) 0.0844
Academic Ranking in a Classroom (Wave 2) 0.8415
Academic Ranking in a School (Wave 2) 0.7572
Subjective Evaluation of Academic Performance (Wave 2) 0.2677
Index: Locus of Control (Wave 2) 0.1309
Index: Self-Esteem (Wave 2) 0.1138
Index: Irresponsibility (Wave 2) 0.0891
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Table 1.6: First Stage Regression of the Use of Private Tutoring (Equation (1.3))
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
β1: Constant -0.0000 0.0042
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2250
∗∗∗ 0.0551
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2354 0.2231
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1769
∗∗∗ 0.0573
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.1290
∗∗ 0.0551
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 “Peer” is defined as students within ±15 in the rank of household income in a class.
Table 1.7: Regression of Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1))
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
γCC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8076
∗∗∗ 0.1154
γCNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2691
∗∗ 0.1235
γCP : Private Tutoring t = 2 -0.0768 0.1442
ρC : Elasticity of Substitution 0.0012 0.6218
φC : Residuals for Control 0.1106 0.1402
γC : Constant -0.0000 0.0022
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.8: Regression of Non-Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.2))
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
γNCC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 -0.0209 0.0392
γNCNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8792
∗∗∗ 0.1582
γNCP : Private Tutoring t = 2 0.1417 0.1874
ρNC : Elasticity of Substitution -0.0304 1.4885
φNC : Residuals for Control -0.1445 0.1860
γNC : Constant -0.0000 0.0013
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
All standard errors are calculated from 3,000 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.9: Different Bound of Income Ranking - First Stage Regression of the Use of
Private tutoring (Equation (1.3))
“Peer” based on Bound of the Income Ranking
Variables ±10 ±20
β1: Constant -0.0002 0.0003
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2272
∗∗∗ 0.2253∗∗∗
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2398 0.2315
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1742
∗∗∗ 0.1799∗∗∗
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.1370
∗∗ 0.1325∗∗
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
Table 1.10: Different Bound of Income Ranking - Regression of Cognitive and Non-
Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
“Peer” based on Bound of the Income Ranking
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables ±10 ±20 ±10 ±20
γC 0.8040
∗∗∗ 0.8096∗∗∗ -0.0224 -0.0178
γNC 0.2535
∗∗ 0.2796∗∗ 0.8768∗∗∗ 0.8880∗∗∗
γP -0.0575 -0.0892 0.1456 0.1298
ρ -0.0297 -0.0400 0.0037 0.0739
φ 0.0911 0.1219 -0.1477 -0.1329
γ -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.11: Different Bound of Academic Ranking - First Stage Regression of the Use
of Private tutoring (Equation (1.3))
“Peer” based on Bound of the Academic Ranking
Variables ±10 ±15 ±20
β1: Constant 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2051
∗∗ 0.2109∗∗∗ 0.2193∗∗∗
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2512 0.2405 0.2781
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1870
∗∗∗ 0.1899∗∗∗ 0.1851∗∗∗
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.1262
∗∗ 0.1427∗∗∗ 0.1290∗∗
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
Table 1.12: Different Bound of Academic Ranking - Regression of Cognitive and
Non-Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
“Peer” based on Bound of the Academic Ranking
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables ±10 ±15 ±20 ±10 ±15 ±20
γC 0.8166
∗∗∗ 0.8122∗∗∗ 0.8165∗∗∗ -0.0181 -0.0224 -0.0160
γNC 0.2724
∗ 0.2589∗∗ 0.2801∗∗ 0.8847∗∗∗ 0.8748∗∗∗ 0.8945∗∗∗
γP -0.0889 -0.0701 -0.0966 0.1335 0.1476 0.1215
ρ -0.0275 0.0130 -0.0462 -0.0157 -0.0335 -0.0332
φ 0.1299 0.1010 0.1286 -0.1353 -0.1506 -0.1221
γ 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.13: Different Specification of Matrices - First Stage Regression of the Use of
Private tutoring (Equation (1.3))
Specification A B C
β1: Constant -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2442
∗∗∗ 0.2319∗∗∗ 0.2373∗∗∗
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.1297 0.1717 0.1631
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1766
∗∗∗ 0.1735∗∗∗ 0.1797∗∗∗
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.1332
∗∗ 0.1324∗∗ 0.1372∗∗
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
Table 1.14: Different Specification of Matrices - Regression of Cognitive and Non-
Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables A B C A B C
γC 0.8153
∗∗∗ 0.8172∗∗∗ 0.7993∗∗∗ -0.0095 -0.0057 -0.0213
γNC 0.1914
∗∗ 0.2338∗∗ 0.2221∗∗ 0.9890∗∗∗ 0.9865∗∗∗ 0.8497∗∗∗
γP -0.0067 -0.0510 -0.0214 0.0205 0.0192 0.1716
ρ -0.0294 -0.0264 0.0208 0.0005 0.1102 -0.1337
φ 0.0400 0.0837 0.0571 -0.0305 -0.0246 -0.1804
γ -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.15: Different Selection of Measurements - First Stage Regression of the Use
of Private tutoring (Equation (1.3))
Specification A B
β1: Constant -0.0001 -0.0000
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2301
∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.3368 0.1050
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1841
∗∗∗ 0.1672∗∗∗
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.1407
∗∗∗ 0.1286∗∗
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 3,000 bootstrapping.
Table 1.16: Different Selection of Measurements -Regression of Cognitive and Non-
Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables A B A B
γC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.6239
∗∗∗ 0.7389∗∗∗ -0.0149 -0.0206
γNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.3857
∗∗ 0.4047∗∗ 0.8073∗∗∗ 0.8576∗∗∗
γP : Private Tutoring t = 2 -0.0096 -0.1436 0.2076 0.1630
ρ: Elasticity of Substitution -0.0155 0.0227 -0.0018 0.0044
φ: Residuals for Control 0.0667 0.1876 -0.2022 -0.1688
γ: Constant -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 3,000 bootstrapping (for A).
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Table 1.17: Different Number of Bootstrapping - First Stage Regression of the Use of
Private tutoring (Equation (1.3))
Specification 300 2,000 4,000
β1: Constant -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2272
∗∗∗ 0.2272∗∗∗ 0.2255∗∗∗
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2354 0.2264 0.2364
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1814
∗∗∗ 0.1760∗∗∗ 0.1768∗∗∗
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.1330
∗∗ 0.1287∗∗ 0.1308∗∗
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.18: Different Number of Bootstrapping -Regression of Cognitive and Non-
Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables 300 2,000 4,000 300 2,000 4,000
γC 0.8052
∗∗∗ 0.8077∗∗∗ 0.8056∗∗∗ -0.0227 -0.0210 -0.0206
γNC 0.2596
∗∗ 0.2696∗∗ 0.2687∗∗ 0.8813∗∗∗ 0.8779∗∗∗ 0.8805∗∗∗
γP -0.0648 -0.0773 -0.00744 0.1413 0.1431 0.1401
ρ -0.0339 0.0096 -0.0014 -0.0567 -0.0123 -0.0124
φ 0.0986 0.1110 0.1085 -0.1436 -0.1460 -0.1427
γ -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 1.19: Timing of Private Tutoring - First Stage Regression of the Use of Private
tutoring (Equation (1.3))
Specification As of t = 1
β1: Constant -0.0000
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2296
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 -0.1044
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1247
∗∗
N 1,652
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 3,000 boot-
strapping.
2 Note that the dependent variable is the use of pri-
vate tutoring at t = 1.
Table 1.20: Timing of Private Tutoring -Regression of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive
Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables As of t = 1 As of t = 1
γC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8384
∗∗∗ -0.0137
γNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.3798
∗∗ 0.9030∗∗∗
γP : Private Tutoring t = 1 -0.2182 0.1107
ρ: Elasticity of Substitution -0.0036 -0.0101
φ: Residuals for Control 0.2369 -0.1198
γ: Constant -0.0000 -0.0000
N 1,652
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Standard Errors are calculated from 3,000 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.21: Standardized Measurements - First Stage Regression of the Use of Private
tutoring (Equation (1.3))
Specification Standardized
β1: Constant -0.0000
β2: Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2654
∗∗∗
β3: Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.0749
β4: Residual of Income Regression 0.1064
∗∗∗
β5: Peer Behavior of the Use of Private Tutoring 0.0858
∗∗∗
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.22: Standardized Measurements - Regression of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive
Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2))
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables Standardized Standardized
γC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8315
∗∗∗ -0.0435
γNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.1095
∗ 0.6690∗∗∗
γP : Private Tutoring t = 1 0.0591 0.3745
∗∗
ρ: Elasticity of Substitution -0.0000 -0.0010
φ: Residuals for Control -0.0203 -0.3836∗∗
γ: Constant -0.0000 0.0000
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.23: Standardized Measurements - Regression of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive
Skills (Equation (1.1) and (1.2)): Cobb-Douglas
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables Standardized Standardized
γC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8309
∗∗∗ -0.0437
γNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.1100
∗ 0.6695∗∗∗
γP : Private Tutoring t = 1 0.0591 0.3742
∗∗
φ: Residuals for Control -0.0201 -0.3831∗∗
γ: Constant -0.0000 0.0000
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Standard errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.24: Regression of Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.1)): Cobb-Douglas
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
γCC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8074
∗∗∗ 0.1155
γCNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.2698
∗∗ 0.1230
γCP : Private Tutoring t = 1 -0.0772 0.1439
φC : Residuals for Control 0.1108 0.1397
γC : Constant -0.0000 0.0019
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.25: Regression of Non-Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.2)): Cobb-Douglas
Variables Coefficient Standard Error
γNCC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 -0.0210 0.0392
γNCNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8791
∗∗∗ 0.1582
γNCP : Private Tutoring t = 2 0.1419 0.1874
φNC : Residuals for Control -0.1445 0.1859
γNC : Constant 0.0000 0.0012
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Standard errors are calculated from 3,000 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.26: Regression of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.11) and
(1.12)): Cobb-Douglas without γC + γNC + γP = 1 (Baseline Scale)
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
γC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.7587
∗∗∗ 0.1183 -0.0077 0.0320
γNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.3943
∗∗ 0.1649 0.8610∗∗∗ 0.2319
γP : Private Tutoring t = 1 0.1328 0.1238 0.0797 0.0794
φ: Residuals for Control -0.1003 -0.8496 -0.0830 0.0799
γ: Constant 0.0000 0.0017 -0.0000 0.0001
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.27: Regression of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills (Equation (1.11) and
(1.12)): Cobb-Douglas without γC + γNC + γP = 1 (Standardized Scale)
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
Variables Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
γC : Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.8127
∗∗∗ 0.1118 0.0225 0.0656
γNC : Non-Cognitive Skills t = 1 0.1112
∗ 0.0611 0.6662∗∗∗ 0.1426
γP : Private Tutoring t = 1 0.1305 0.1305 0.1093 0.1581
φ: Residuals for Control -0.0915 0.1263 -0.1182 0.1576
γ: Constant 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 0.0073
N 1,686
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Standard errors are calculated from 300 bootstrapping.
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Table 1.28: Regression of Variables related to Cognitive Skills
Variables Ranking (Class) Ranking (School) Sub.Eval
Leg of Dep. Variable 0.777∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
Priv. Tut t = 2 -0.219∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Priv. Tut t = 1 -0.032 -0.005 -0.000
Self-Study t = 2 -0.135∗ -0.176∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Self-Study t = 1 0.066 0.060 0.000
Older Sib. 0.104 -0.324 0.005
Younger Sib. -0.502 -1.211 0.017∗∗∗
Educ. of Mother -0.135 -0.275 0.004
Educ. of Father -0.717 -0.611 0.006∗
Homeownership -2.482∗∗ -1.195 0.008
(Log) Income 0.146 -0.077 0.007
N 1,655 1,655 1,655
R2 0.731 0.695 0.581
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.29: Regression of Variables related to Non-Cognitive Skills
Variables Locus of Ctr Self-Esteem Irresponsibility
Leg of Y 0.471∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
Priv. Tut t = 2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002∗∗
Priv. Tut t = 1 0.000 0.000 0.001
Self-Study t = 2 0.001 0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
Self-Study t = 1 0.001 0.000 0.000
Older Sib. 0.005 0.002 -0.002
Younger Sib. 0.001 -0.004 -0.014∗
Educ. of Mother 0.002 0.006 0.004
Educ. of Father 0.002 0.003 -0.006
Homeownership 0.021∗ 0.026∗∗ -0.014
(Log) Income -0.002 0.009 0.006
N 1,655 1,655 1,655
R2 0.277 0.249 0.285
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Questions used to Construct Indexes of Non-Cognitive Skills
• Locus of Control
1 I have confidence in my own decision
2 I believe that I can deal with my problems by myself
3 I am taking full responsibility of my own life
• Self-Esteem
1 I think that I have a good character
2 I think that I am a competent person
3 I think that I am a worthy person
• Irresponsibility
1 I jump into exciting things even if I have to take an examination tomorrow
2 I abandon a task once it becomes hard and laborious to do
3 I am apt to enjoy risky activities
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1.7.2 List of Variables used in the Estimation
• Cognitive Skills
1 Academic Ranking in a Class
2 Academic Ranking in a School
3 Self-Evaluation of Academic Performance for 4 Subjects: Korean, Social
Science, Mathematics, and Science
• Non-Cognitive Skills
1 The Index of Locus of Control
2 The Index of Self-Esteem
3 The Index of Irresponsibility
• Other Observable Variables
1 The Use of Private Tutoring
2 The Peer Use of Private Tutoring
3 The Residuals of Regression of Household Income on the Fathers’ Years of
Education
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1.7.3 List of Moment Conditions used in the Estimation
The following equations are moment conditions which can be used for Minimum
Distance Estimator.
Assume E[Ω] = 0 (implies A ≡ E[M ] = τµAM + (1− τ)µBM).
Then, from the (1.6), the following moment conditions are derived.
1. τΛµA + (1− τ)ΛµB = 0 (15 equations)
2. ΛµA = µAM − A (15 equations)
3. ΛµB = µBM − A (15 equations)
4. ΛΣAΛ
′
+ Σ = ΣAM (225 equations)
5. ΛΣBΛ
′
+ Σ = ΣBM (225 equations)
6. τµA + (1− τ)µB = 0 (7 equations),
where µA, µB are mean vectors of each component of Ω, µAM , µ
B
M are mean vectors of
each component of M , ΣA,ΣB are variance-covariance matrices of each component
of Ω, ΣAM ,Σ
B
M are variance-covariance matrices of each component of M , τ is the
mixture weight, and Σ is a variance-covariance matrix of .
56
1.7.4 Specifications of Λ
The below table summarizes four specifications, mentioned in Section 1.5.2.
Matrix Main A B C
Λ Large Small Large Small
 Large Small Small Large
The definition of “Large” Λ is
Cog1 NonCog1 Cog2 NonCog2 P.Tut. Peer.P. Resi.Inc.

C.Rank.1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
S.Rank.1 λ21 0 0 0 0 0 0
SubjG1 λ31 λ32 0 0 0 0 0
Locus1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SelfEs1 0 λ52 0 0 0 0 0
Irresp1 0 λ62 0 0 0 0 0
C.Rank.2 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
S.Rank.2 0 0 λ83 0 0 0 0
SubjG2 0 0 λ93 λ94 0 0 0
Locus2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
SelfEs2 0 0 0 λ11,4 0 0 0
Irresp2 0 0 0 λ12,4 0 0 0
P.Tut. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Peer.P. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Resi.Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
.
“Small” Λ is defined as letting both λ32 and λ94 be zero.
The definition of “Large”  is
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1.7.5 Specifications of Measurements
The below table summarizes 3 specifications, mentioned in Section 1.5.3.
Measurement Baseline A B
Academic Ranking in a Class X · ·
Academic Ranking in a School X X X
Residual from the Regression of
Class Ranking on School Ranking · · X
Self-Evaluation:
Korean, Social Science, Mathematics, and Science X · X
Self-Evaluation: Korean, Social Science · X ·
Self-Evaluation: Mathematics, and Science · X ·
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2 The Effect of Coresiding Grandparents on Edu-
cational Investment for Children
2.1 Introduction
It is not difficult to find households with three generations not only in the United
States but also in the rest of the world. In the United States, the 2014 American
Community Survey estimates that roughly 4% of households are multigenerational.
Both the number and percentage of such households are on the rise.25 This phe-
nomenon is evident not only in developed countries but also in developing countries
such as India, where approximately 30% of urban households and more than 60%
of rural households are multigenerational.26 In South Korea, from which the data
used in this paper are collected, about 4.9% of households have a three-generational
makeup, which is slightly higher than in the United States. (2010 National Survey of
Families).
There are many reasons which may explain why people choose to create multi-
generational households. First, expensive housing can make multigenerational house-
holds as an economic choice to reduce living expenses. Ermisch (1999) points out
that young people who live in areas with high housing prices tend to return to their
25According to the ACS, multigenerational households are defined as one of the following three
types: (1) includes a householder, a parent or parent-in-law of the householder, and a child of
the householder; (2) includes a householder, a child of the householder, and a grandchild of the
householder; and (3) includes a householder, a parent or parent-in-law of the householder, a child
of the householder, and a grandchild of the householder. Throughout the paper, I use the term
“multigenerational households” to indicate households living together with at least one member of
the grandparents’ generation.
26“Global Perspectives on Multigenerational Households and Intergenerational Relations,” ILC
Global Alliance Report (2012).
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parents’ houses. Second, multigenerational households can reduce the financial and
nonfinancial burden of childcare. This is because retired grandparents are able to sup-
ply childcare service at a lower cost. This unofficial service may also be more reliable,
because they are members of the same family. It has been found that reduced burden
from childcare helps working-age females to provide more working hours and earn
more income (e.g., Cortes and Pan (2013)). Lastly, longer life spans may increase the
necessity of multigenerational households because younger household members can
provide physical and mental care for the old generation by living together. The infor-
mal care may be a substitute for more costly formal care (Van Houtven and Norton
(2004)).
Based on this phenomenon, investigating the economic effect of multigenerational
households on a variety of aspects is an important agenda. In this paper, I specifi-
cally focus on the effect of coresiding with grandparents on educational investment
for grandchildren in multigenerational households, and the importance of the issue
is evident from the significant nature of such investment. The amounts of invest-
ment are directly related to quality and/or quantity of educational goods or services,
and both may be directly linked with future amounts of human capital of children.
Eventually, it will strongly and positively influence the grandchildren’s future (for a
comprehensive review, refer to Blundell et al. (1999)).
There are several reasons which lead us to presume that such an effect exists
in multigenerational households. First, the decision-making process of multigenera-
tional households may differ from those with a single generation of adults. If an elder
member has a distinct utility function and joins the decision-making process of house-
holds, the allocation of resources in multigenerational households is affected based on
the collective model. Second, even if we assume that only the head and spouse of
households decide on such allocation, the allocation can differ because of the distinct
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characteristics of multigenerational households which are not observed in standard
ones. For example, households with a head and spouse who place a greater value
on public goods are more likely to create multigenerational households, which may
affect educational investment, as expenses for children are considered public goods
(e.g., Blundell et al. (2005)).
The issue can also be important for policymakers because living in a multigen-
erational household is not a randomly assigned behavior. Rather, decisions may be
related to a lot of socioeconomic variables. As mentioned above, motivations related
to living expenses, such as rents or childcare, can contribute to these decisions. In
addition, it is also possible that immigrants from specific regions are more likely to
create multigenerational households because of their regional characteristics including
economic status or cultural background. Indeed, it is reported that the proportion
of multigenerational households is higher within households headed by immigrants
than those headed by Americans.27 In addition, the growth rates of multigenera-
tional households is the highest for Hispanics (from 2007 to 2009), and the most
likely groups to form this type of households are Asians (in 2009).28 This suggests
that cultural differences can be an important factor that contributes to the creation of
multigenerational households. This correlation between multigenerational households
and socioeconomic variables leads to policy considerations. For example, if there is
a negative effect of multigenerational households on educational investment, policy-
27Fry, Richard and Jeffrey S. Passel. 2014. “In Post-Recession Era, Young Adults Drive Contin-
uing Rise in Multi-generational Living. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2014.
28Taylor et al. 2011. “Fighting Poverty in a Tough Economy, Americans Move in with Their Rel-
atives Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Centers Social and Demographic Trends project, October.
The definition of multigenerational households used in these two reports is not equal to the previous
definition in the ACS. In these two reports, households with more than two adult generations are
defined as multigenerational households.
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makers may create policies which can help children who are more likely to live with
multiple generations to receive an adequate level of educational investment.
In this paper, I pursue two goals to further our understanding of the issue. First,
I show a strong negative effect of multigenerational households on educational in-
vestment through a regression model with a Korean panel dataset. Further, I also
show that the effect mainly stems from female children. My estimated coefficient
for male children is not significantly different from zero, but the estimate for female
children is significantly negative. To address the expected endogeneity of coresidence,
I adopt two instrumental variables: the number of older brothers of the household
head and the (per capita) number of facilities in the cultural infrastructure of the
city (or equivalent local government) of residence. As expected, the estimates from
the ordinary least square estimation are very different from those from the regression
with instrumental variables. By employing the instrumental variables, I can expect to
control unobservable characteristics which are correlated to having an elder member
in households and which also influence decisions on educational investment. Section
2.3 and Section 2.4 explains the backgrounds of empirical results, data, and variables
used in the paper in detail.
Second, to further explore the underlying mechanism, I test whether coresiding
grandparents participate in the decision-making process in a household. If they do, it
suggests that a negative effect may exist because of distinct components in preferences
(utility functions) of coresiding grandparents. For example, they may be less likely
to care for the human capital of grandchildren because benefits from higher levels
of such human capital are likely to be realized postmortem. By employing testing
methods developed through earlier research (such as Browning and Chiappori (1998)
and Dauphin et al. (2011)), I show some convincing evidence of the participation
of coresiding grandparents in the decision-making process. Following Browning and
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Chiappori (1998) and Dauphin et al. (2011), based on sample households including
a grandparent-generation member from the same data set of Korea, I test the rank
of two matrices related to the utility maximizing problem of the collective model.
The ranks of the two matrices are closely connected to the number of decision-makers
in the households because the results depend on the weights on the members. The
results suggest three, not two, decision-makers in the sample household. Hence, the
results can be interpreted as evidence of the participation of coresiding grandparents.
The details of the test will be also explained Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.
This paper offers two main contributions to two strands of the literature: the
economics of education and the household decision-making. The first comes from
empirically showing the effect of the multigenerational household structure on ed-
ucational investment. The estimates are different from those of previously reports
(see Section 2.2). As mentioned, to address potential endogeneity issues, I apply
instrumental variables to the regression. In addition, I use all the academic-purpose
expenses for each child in households, so the observations cover a variety of ages or
types of school they attend. Hence, it is possible to capture the effect on educational
“investment” rather than the attendance of schools. It is also possible to estimate
potentially heterogeneous effects for male children and female children.
The second contribution comes from supplementing evidence of additional
decision-makers in households in contrast to the traditional collective model, which
consists of only two-decision makers (head and spouse). This paper adopts the same
testing method as that of Dauphin et al. (2011) but focuses on grandparents rather
than older children. Along with the trend of longer life span, this paper provides im-
portant potential evidence of a third decision-maker in multigenerational households.
Furthermore, the test results help us understand the reason behind regression results
shown in the first part of this paper.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the related
literature. Section 2.3 gives empirical models for estimating the effect with a detailed
explanation of variables and assumption adopted for the regression. In addition,
testing methods to find the number of decision-makers are also introduced in this
section. Section 2.4 describes the data set and shows summary statistics for variables
used in the analysis. Section 2.5 introduces estimated results from the regression and
test statistics, and Section 2.6 discusses robustness checks. The final section provides
the conclusion.
2.2 Related Literature
First, this paper is related to the literature that empirically studies the effect of core-
siding grandparents on educational investment for children. To my knowledge, Bogan
(2015) is the most relevant paper in this topic. Bogan (2015) reports the effect of co-
residing grandparents on several investment decisions of household by employing U.S.
data. One of these decisions is whether households hold a tax-advantaged educational
purpose savings account, and the paper reports a negative effect on this variable. The
results can be understood as a negative effect of coresidence on educational invest-
ment. However, Bogan (2015) does not address the potential endogeneity issue of
coresidency. In addition, holding an account for college-specific savings cannot reflect
actual monetary investment for educational purpose covering a variety of ages and
types of spending.
Second, papers that consider the decision-making of households about children are
related to this paper. Examples of literature include Thomas (1990) and Duflo (2003),
who have established that female members are likely to allocate more resource to
children compared to their male counterparts. However, to my knowledge, studies on
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the effects of other household members on children are scarce. La Fave and Thomas
(2017) is one closely related study. La Fave and Thomas (2017) use Indonesian
data and show that family (coresident or not coresident) members may also influence
a variety of variables related to children’s well-being. The similarity between La
Fave and Thomas (2017) and this paper is that both look at the household (family)
decision-making process, taking into account additional members (beyond head and
spouse). However, there is also a considerable difference. This paper focuses on the
effect of coresiding. In other words, this paper compares households living together
with grandparents and households which consist of only two generations. On the other
hand, the main focus of La Fave and Thomas (2017) is the effects of members’ wealth
distribution inside the family, which may be related to the distribution of bargaining
power, on the resource allocation for children. In addition, this paper studies the effect
on academic-related spending, which is close to educational “investment” rather than
children’s well-being.
Lastly, this paper is also closely related to studies that consider the number of
decision-makers in households. Several papers (e.g., Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Cher-
chye et al. (2009)) reject the unitary model (i.e., only one decision-maker). In con-
trast, the collective model with two decision-makers (household head and spouse) has
been developed and widely used (e.g., Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori
and Ekeland (2006)). In line with the collective model, some papers explore the pos-
sibility of more than two decision-makers in the collective model, such as Dauphin et
al. (2011). Dauphin et al. (2011) argue that households with children aged 16 and
above have more than two decision-makers, using British data. It suggests that (rel-
atively) older children may join the decision-making process. I adopt the same tests
used in Dauphin et al. (2011). The tests are based on the collective model of house-
hold decision-making being developed through a number of papers such as Browning
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and Chiappori (1998). I apply the tests to determine whether grandparents join the
decision-making.
2.3 The Empirical Model and Tests
2.3.1 Estimating the Effect on Educational Investment
The econometric model for the relationship between educational investment and cores-
idence of grandparents can be expressed as
yh,t = α + Σtηt + βch,t + δ
TXh,t + h,t, (2.1)
where yh,t is the dependent variable; each ηt is an indicator variable of year t exclud-
ing the earliest year; ch,t is the main explanatory variable, an indicator variable of
coresidence of grandparents; and Xh,t is a vector of household-level control variables.
The main dependent variable yh,t is the monetary amounts of educational investment
per child of household h at year t. Children up to college-attending are included in
the calculation. Note that I exclude expenditure on childcare to capture the change
in expenses with academic purpose. One caveat is that this variable is observed as
dependent on attendance in college if a child had graduated from high school. I dis-
cuss the implication of this issue in Section 2.5. To study the potential difference by
gender, there are three versions of yh,t: (1) including male and female, (2) including
only male, and (3) including only female. ch,t is equal to 1 if there is a grandparent-
generation (i.e., parents of household head or spouse) member in household h. Xh,t
includes a dummy of living in the Greater Seoul area (i.e., living around the capital
city), years of education of household spouse, the number of college-attending chil-
dren, the total number of children, the net amount of assets, the household income,
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and age gap between head and spouse (age of head minus age of spouse). Errors are
clustered based on each household to capture the potential correlation of errors in
the same household across time.
The goal of this section is to achieve reliable estimates of β. This goal can be ac-
complished using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation under several assumptions,
including E[ch,th,t] = 0. This equation may be violated if there are measurement er-
rors or endogeneity in ch,t. Endogeneity can especially be a serious issue because the
value of ch,t is decided by each household rather than assigned randomly. The decision
can be affected by a number of observable and/or unobservable factors. These factors
can also simultaneously influence the consumption decision of households, including
decisions on educational goods or services. For example, the risk attitudes of the head
or spouse may influence both decisions. Households with a head and/or spouse who
is risk-averse may want to have an elder member in their household because cores-
idence may facilitate the use of the household self-insurance function. One possible
scenario is that grandparents provide informal childcare to help wives work in the
labor market during their husbands’ adverse income shocks.29 These households may
invest less money for the children’s education if they believe that such expenditure is
a risky type of investment.30
In practice, it is indeed controversial to impose assumptions that make OLS esti-
mators consistent. If these assumptions are violated, estimated coefficients from (2.1)
would not be consistent anymore. One solution to the endogeneity problem is to use
instrumental variables. I use two stage least square (TSLS) estimates, and results
29The additional labor supply of female members in households as self-insurance has been docu-
mented by many papers, such as Attanasio et al. (2005).
30Checchi et al. (2014) documents the negative relationship between parents’ risk aversion and
children’s college enrollment.
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based on this estimation are the preferred results in this paper. The TSLS model is
yh,t = α + Σtηt + βch,t + δ
TXh,t + h,t, (2.2)
ch,t = γ + Σtλt + τ
TZh,t + ψ
TXh,t + ηh,t, (2.3)
where (2.3) is the first-stage equation, Zh,t = [z1,h,tz2,h,t]
T is a vector of two in-
strumental variables (IV), and z1,h,t is the number of older brothers of the household
head. It is reasonable to assume that the need to coreside with grandparents (or
grandparents-in-law) is related to physical and/or mental support. If there are multi-
ple brothers, it means there are more alternatives to support their parents. Hence, it
may be linked with a lower tendency of coresiding (i.e., negative relationship between
z1,h,t and ch,t). z1,h,t counts only male siblings because most of households in the
sample have parents of the household head (i.e., husband) as grandparent-generation
members. Based on observations used to estimate (2.2) and (2.3), only around 5%
of households with grandparent-generation members have the parents-in-law of the
head. This means that the existence of outside options in the perspective of the head
matters. The reason why the number of older brothers is considered rather than the
total number of brothers is based on Korean culture. In Korea, the norm is that the
parents are usually supported by the eldest brother (Das Gupta et al. (2003)).
z2,h,t is the number of facilities (per 100,000 residents) in the cultural infrastruc-
ture, such as libraries, in the city of residence of household h (details are in Section
2.4). If there is plenty of cultural infrastructure, elderly people have many options
to spend their leisure time. Given the age of people living together with their grand-
children, many of them may retire from their work. Hence, venues where they can
spend their leisure time can be an important factor for their choice of location for
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living. In this sense, it is expected that there is a positive relationship between z2,h,t
and ch,t. Like the above ordinary least squares estimation, clustered errors based on
each household are used.
Consequently, from both the OLS and IV estimation in Section 2.5, if all classical
assumptions are satisfied, it is expected that the estimates from each model are not
very different. The results show significant differences, however, so results from the
IV estimation are the preferred results of this paper. Details are discussed in Section
2.5.
2.3.2 Testing the Number of Decision-Makers
To further explore the economic mechanism behind the significant effect of coresi-
dency, I perform two tests on the number of decision-makers within each household.
I follow the testing procedure that has been developed through previous research,
such as those of Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Banks et al. (1997). The proce-
dure is adopted by Dauphin et al. (2011), and the paper shares a similar goal: to test
the number of decision-makers. Hence, I follow the approach and notations used in
Dauphin et al. (2011). The testing procedure utilizes the utility-maximizing problem
of households in the context of the collective model. In the model, the household-
utility function is defined as a weighted sum of individuals’ (decision-makers’) utility
functions. Naturally, the optimal solution, observed in the data, includes informa-
tion about the number of individual-level functions, which is equal to the number of
decision-makers. In the following two subsections, I briefly introduce the theoretical
and empirical framework of the testing procedure.
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2.3.2.1 Theoretical Framework
Each household solves the following optimization program:
Max
S+1∑
i=1
µi(pi,y)Ui(x1, . . . ,xS+1,x
∗), (P)
subject to
piT [(
S+1∑
i=1
xi)
T ,x∗T ]T = 1. (PS)
S+1 is the number of people in the decision-making process. S+1 may be equal to
the size of a household if all the members join the decision-making procedure. S = 1
is true, if only the head and spouse of the household participate. The focus of the
test is to test whether S = 2 is persuasive when there are three adult members: head,
spouse, and one of grandparent-generation members. Ui is the utility function of each
member. The arguments Ui, x1, . . . ,xS+1 are the private consumption vectors of each
member, and x∗ is a consumption vector of public goods. It is assumed that the
utility functions are strongly concave and are twice differentiable in each argument.
pi is a price vector.
µi is a scalar function, which reflects the Pareto weight of member i. If µi = 0,
member i does not participate in the decision-making process. If µi = 1, member i
solely decides the allocation of resources within the household, so i’s utility function
is the household-level utility function. The price vector pi is included as an argument
of µi because change in prices over goods may also alter the bargaining power of each
member. For example, a higher price of medical goods or services may increase the
importance of financial support from sons or daughters to their old parents, which
may decrease the bargaining power of coresiding grandparents. y = [y1, . . . , yK ]
T is a
vector of K distribution factors. The distribution factors are independent of individ-
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ual preferences and do not alter the household’s budget constraint. Examples include
the household member’s income share (Browning and Chiappori (1998)) and change
in alimony rights (Rangel (2006)). Note that the household income is normalized to
1. This is because the tests focus on the share of expenditure rather than the absolute
amounts.
The existence of µi functions which satisfy µ1 ≥ 0, . . . , µS+1 ≥ 0, with
∑S+1
i=1 µi =
1, is based on the following three axioms (Dauphin et al. (2011)):31
Axiom 2.1 Each member i has their own preferences over the goods consumed in the
household.
Axiom 2.2 The decision-making process leads to Pareto-efficient allocations.
Axiom 2.3 The decision-process depends on K distribution factors y ≡ (y1, . . . , yK)T
that are independent of individual preferences and that do not modify the overall
household’s budget constraint.
The data have several variables related to this optimization problem. For example,
the data include the amounts of expenditure on a number of categories, such as
food, health, or educational goods. Other examples include household income, price
indices, and some distribution factors. The information mentioned above is exploited
to perform tests on the number of decision-makers. The details of tests are described
in the following paragraphs.
Specifically, this paper exploits two different tests on the number of decision-
makers. The two tests use price variations and distribution factors, respectively. The
first test is designed from two propositions developed by Browning and Chiappori
(1998).
31Each µi is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and homogeneous of degree zero in
pi and m.
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Proposition 2.4 (SR(S) condition, Browning and Chiappori (1998)) : If ξ(pi,y)
solves the program (P), then the Slutsky matrix associated with ξ(pi,y) can be decom-
posed as follows:
L(pi,y) = Σ(pi,y) +R(pi,y), (2.4)
where Σ is a symmetric and negative matrix and R is a matrix of rank at most S.
ξ(pi,y) is a reduced form of demand system.
Proposition 2.5 (Browning and Chiappori (1998)) : Let M(pi,y) ≡ L(pi,y) −
L(pi,y)T . Then the rank of the antisymmetric matrix M(pi,y) is at most 2S.
Proposition 1 is closely related to the standard Slutsky restrictions. Σ(pi,y) cor-
responds to the price effects on consumption, given the values of utility and Pareto
weights. The special feature of the collective model is reflected through R(pi,y),
which includes effects on the demand via changes in bargaining power. In the opti-
mization program, there are S + 1 functions of µi, reflecting the bargaining power of
each member. With a restriction,
∑S+1
i=1 µi = 1, there can be only S Pareto weights
which can move independently. It explains why the maximum rank of R is S. Propo-
sition 2 helps us link Proposition 1 to an observable matrix (explained in the following
section), M.
The second test originates from the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6 (Chiappori and Ekeland (2006)) : If ξ(pi,y) solves the program
(P) and if the number of distribution factors (K) and the number of goods (N) are
at least equal to S, then we have rank(Θ) ≤ S, where Θ ≡ Dyξ.
Θ represents the effects of changes in the distribution factors, y, on the demand.
y affects the solution of (P) only through the bargaining power (the Pareto weight) of
each member, and S is the maximum number of independent Pareto weights. Hence,
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if we have more than S distributional factors, the effects of the factors cannot be
independent.
2.3.2.2 Empirical Framework
Section 2.3.2.1 suggests two matrices, M and Θ, for the tests. The first empirical task
is estimating parameters which compose these two matrices based on household-level
data. Following Dauphin et al. (2011), the estimation is based on the QUAIDS model
proposed by Banks et al. (1997). The QUAIDS model has a flexible functional form
and makes the tests concise (discussed in Section 2.3.2.3.). The model depicts the
household budget share for each category of consumption as a nonlinear function of
prices, the distribution factors, the household income, and other control variables.
Let w be the N × 1 vector of the household budget share, where N is the number of
consumption categories. Then the system of household budget share is modeled as
follows:
w = α(z1) + Θy + Γp + β(z2)[ln(m)− a(p, z1)] + λ [ln(m)− a(p, z1)]
2
b(p, z2)
+ v,
(2.5)
where α(z1), β(z2), and λ are N × 1 vectors and Θ and Γ are N ×K and N ×N
dimension matrices to be estimated, respectively. p is an N × 1 vector of prices.
z1 and z2 are vectors of control variables. z1 includes the constant term, the
dummy for living in the Greater Seoul area, and the dummy for home ownership. z2
includes the dummy for living in metropolitan area and the dummy for homeowner-
ship. These variables are not exactly equal to those used in Dauphin et al. (2011)
but quite similar.32
32In Dauphin et al. (2011), regional dummies, seasonal dummies, and car and home ownership
are used.
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y is a K × 1 vector of distribution factors which consist of the log of the head’s
income, years of education of coresiding grandparents, gender of coresiding grand-
parents, and the number of older brothers of the household head. Note that system
(2.5) explains the shares, so these distribution factors are conditional on the amounts
of total expenditure. While I follow Browning and Chiappori (1998) and include the
log of the head’s income, the three other variables are contained to reflect the focus
of this article, the bargaining power of coresiding grandparents. Years of education
and gender can reflect the implicit value of the elder members in the labor market,
and the number of older brothers may represent the availability of other potential
caregivers. Hence, these variables reflect the values of outside options.
I use 10 categories of nondurable goods and services in this paper: food, outside
food, educational purpose, vehicle maintenance, consumption for health, cultural
purpose, communication, clothes, public transportation, and housewares. Following
Dauphin et al. (2011), I estimate a system of only nine equations excluding housewares
and use the log of relative price (relative to housewares, the reference good).33 Hence,
N = 9 in this paper.
Two price indices, a(p, z1) and b(p, z2), are defined as follows:
a(p, z1) = α(z1)
Tp +
1
2
pTΓp. (2.6)
b(p, z2) = exp(β(z2)
Tp). (2.7)
ln(m) is the log of total expenditure on the 10 categories mentioned above. Note
that these 10 categories do not include durable goods. Dauphin et al. (2011) points
out that this variable may suffer potential endogeneity and measurement errors, and
33Based on properties of additivity and homogeneity. Details are in Dauphin et al. (2011).
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Dauphin et al. (2011) uses the control function method to address the issue. Including
the control function means that one more regressor is added into (2.5) because the
error term is expressed as
v = ρu + , (2.8)
where u is the additional regressor, the residuals from an auxiliary regression of ln(m)
on a set of variables.34
Empirical model (2.5) can be estimated by the usual linear regression of the sys-
tem, only if a(p, z1) and b(p, z2) are treated as given. Iterated ordinary least square
estimation (Blundell and Robin (1999)) is used to address this issue. The iteration
starts with randomly assigned values of α0, β0, and Γ0, based on uniform distribution
(0,1). α0, β0, and Γ0 are used to calculate values of a(p, z1) and b(p, z2) at the initial
stage. After the first iteration, these parameters are newly estimated (α1, β1, and
Γ1), then a(p, z1) and b(p, z2) are updated with α
1, β1, and Γ1. The same procedure
is repeated until the distance between (αT−1, βT−1, and ΓT−1) and (αT , βT , and ΓT )
is smaller than a specific value.35
For the estimation, I impose classical assumptions of the seemingly unrelated
regression on the error term . It may not be a realistic assumption because the
data have a longitudinal form. This means that households are included multiple
times in the regression, if households respond and report that there is a coresiding
grandparent-generational member multiple times. I keep this arguable assumption to
limit the number of parameters to be estimated because of the limited sample size
(986 observations).
34Following Dauphin et al. (2011), I use monthly household income, log of prices, time dummies,
age, and years of education (and square and cubic terms) of each household member.
35In this paper, the value is 0.000001.
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2.3.2.3 Tests
In the above section, I explain how estimates of parameters used for tests are obtained.
The first test is from Proposition 2, which is based on the matrix M = L−LT . A nice
feature of the QUAIDS specification is that useful equality, M = L− LT = Γ− ΓT ,
holds collective rationality assumptions (Axiom 1 and Axiom 2, by Browning and
Chiappori (1998)). With Proposition 2, the hypotheses of the first test are
H0 : rank(M) = 2H,
HA : rank(M) > 2H
for H = 0, 1, 2.
For H = 0, the null hypothesis can be interpreted as there can be one decision-
maker. If H0 is rejected when H = 0 (not justified with a single decision-maker), I
repeat the test with H = 1. Now, H0 means that there can be two decision-makers.
If H0 is rejected again (not justified with two decision-makers), I repeat the test using
H = 2. At this time, collective rationality cannot be justified if H0 is rejected in the
sample. This is because the sample consists of households with only one grandparent;
thus; there are only three potential decision-makers, with the assumption that there
are no other potential decision-makers.36 However, based on Proposition 2, rank(M)
has 4 as its possible upper bound when there are three decision-makers. In short,
the statement “There are three decision-makers in households” is supported when I
reject H0 with H = 0 and H = 1 and do not reject H0 with H = 2.
36It is possible to think that living together with grandparents is positively correlated with the age
of children. If relatively old children indeed participate in the decision-making process, it is possible
that there are more than three decision-makers in the sample households. However, the dataset in
this paper shows that more than 75% of households with grandparents do not have college-attending
children.
77
The second test stems from Proposition 3 and exploits a matrix Θ, which is
directly estimated from (2.5):
H0 : rank(Θ) = H,
HA : rank(Θ) > H
for H = 0, 1, 2.
By the same logic mentioned above, I perform the test sequentially by raising the
value of H from 0 to 2 by 1. Again, the argument that there are three decision-makers
is supported when the null hypothesis is rejected when H = 0 and H = 1 and is not
rejected when H = 2.
The first test performed is the Wald test. The Wald test has a big advantage
because estimation does not need to be done under the null hypothesis. The null
hypothesis, especially when H = 1 and H = 2, creates complex restrictions. Thus,
the Wald test can be helpful in solving the issue (Dauphin et al. (2011)). The second
test is based on the singular value decomposition proposed by Kleibergen and Paap
(2006). The advantage of this method is that arbitrary reparameterization of the null
hypothesis does not affect tests, which is not the case in the Wald test (Dauphin et
al. (2011)). If I can show that both tests provide consistent results which support
the “three decision-makers” argument, that is, a strong indication that the effect of
coresidency found in the regression in Section 2.3.1 stems from the household decision-
making process with a grandparent-generation member. The details of the two tests
are explained in Section 2.8.1 and Section 2.8.2.
2.4 Data
The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) is the principal dataset used
in this paper. KLIPS is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample which con-
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sists of respondents mainly living in urban areas. It focuses on variables related to
information about labor supply and income of each household (and its individual
members), as the name suggests. It started in 1998 with 5,000 households and has
been surveyed annually. Only households living in the “urban” region were included
in the initial survey. Additional households living in the “rural” region were added
in 2009.37
I use two different sets of observations. For Section 2.3.1 (hereafter, the first sam-
ple), I only use “urban” households to maximize the number of observations with the
consistent weighting scheme. It may be a concern that using only urban households
can damage the external validity of results. However, the characteristics of cities in-
cluded in the analysis are still diverse. For example, the population density distributes
from 19.74 to 27,943.74 as of 2014.38 Hence, the results may not be conditional on
living in dense urban areas. I use respondents from 2005 to 2014 because not all
essential questions used in this paper have been asked throughout the entire survey
period. I exclude households with more than three children because these households
are considered as extreme cases (within top 1%). Households with a female head are
also excluded to make efforts for the consistency of our observations in that reporting
a person as head of a household is related to the distribution of bargaining power.
Households with extreme values of educational spending and financial transactions
with outside parents (of head or spouse) are also excluded (top 1% and bottom 1%).
Lastly, I exclude households with children who are older than age 20 and are preparing
for college admission.
37The distinction between “urban” and “rural” is from the classification of local governments. If
a local government is classified as a “city,” households living there are considered as “urban.” If a
local government is classified as a “county,” households living there are considered as “rural.”
38The number of people living per km2.
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For Section 2.3.2 (hereafter, the second sample), the sample consists of households
living with exactly one member of the grandparent generation (i.e., parents of the
household head or spouse). Again, the number of children is fewer than or equal to
three, and heads of households are male for all observations. Because of differences
in information required to perform analysis, the sample period is from 2004 to 2014.
Households living in “rural” regions are included in the second sample to maximize
the sample size.
Some variables are constructed from different datasets. To construct the number
of cultural infrastructure of each city, I use the “e-Local Index” data from the Ko-
rean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). The cultural infrastructure includes a
library, museum, museum of arts, cultural and arts center, cultural center, and cul-
tural house. I use the number of these facilities, divided by a population of 100,000,
of each city and match this figure with the city of residence.
The data of prices used for the second analysis are constructed in the following way.
First, I get the raw consumer prices of an extensive range of goods and services from
the monthly report of the Consumer Price Survey published in February 2008 for each
province or metropolitan city.39 These raw prices are separated by 10 categories (in
3.2.2) and are used to calculate the weighted-average levels of prices of each category
of goods and services.40 Then, by combining annual CPI indices of each category,
I can obtain the average price level of each category across the sample period and
province.
I provide Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 to show the summary statistics of household-level
39A province is a larger unit than a city. Hence, several cities belong to a province.
40Weights for CPI are used. These prices do not include all the goods and serviced used to cal-
culate CPI but does include a significant number of them (380 out of 489). Weights are recalculated
only for goods and services which are available in the data.
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variables for each set of observations. In Table 2.1, the first three variables are the
main dependent variables, which are monetary expenditures on education per child.
For children who have not attended college yet, the expenditure is on private tutoring
(monthly). For children attending college, the expenditure is on tuition and related
expenses (monthly average).41 The raw statistic shows that the three sample mean
values do not differ much. It is also noticeable that variations across households are
substantial. The main independent variable shows that about 6% of households have
at least one member of the grandparent generation. Most of the children have not
attended college yet, which may explain the somewhat small expenses per child. The
average number of children is close to 2, but the average number of college-attending
children is fewer than 0.4. On average, husbands are older than wives. With regard
to the instrumental variable, many households have older brothers of the head, which
is about 0.87 on average.
In Table 2.2, it is observable that the income of a grandparent-generation member
is very low. Given that their average age is above 78, which is much higher than the
usual retirement age, it is not surprising to witness such observation. The majority
of their income is from the national pension system. But in South Korea, the system
was implemented in 1988, meaning that the elder generation would not have much
chance to accumulate their savings from pension. It is also noticeable that most
residing grandparent-generation members are female. Intuitively, this is because the
average life span of a female is longer than that of a male.42 Compared to Table 2.1,
which includes all household with or without grandparents, households are older, less
41Children living in other regions for academic purposes (i.e., attending schools located in other
regions) are required to respond to the survey.
42Statistics from the Korea National Statistical Office in 2013 estimates that the average life span
of males is 78.5 and that of females is 85.1.
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educated, more likely to have a house on average. This difference in socioeconomic
variables strongly suggests that having grandparents in a household cannot be treated
as a randomly assigned variable.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results: Estimating the Effect on Educational Investment
The ordinary least squares estimates from (2.1) are documented in Table 2.3. The unit
of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW, which is slightly smaller than US$ 10.43 Main
estimates, (βˆ), show no significant effect of coresiding on educational spending per
child. This is consistent across all three dependent variables. All the main estimates
have positive numbers, and t-statistics are small. Other estimated coefficients are
generally significant. Living in the Greater Seoul area has a positive effect. The high
density of population in the area may explain this because dense populations are
more likely to cause intense competition among students.44 For example, the average
number of elementary school students per class is 24.3 in Seoul but 22 in Busan,
the second largest city (not in the Greater Seoul area), as of 2014.45 Naturally, it
is more difficult to be the top student in Seoul. If there are more college-attending
children in a household, that household spends more. This is also natural because
the dependent variable includes expenditures on college tuition, which is much higher
43As of February 2018, US$ 1 is about 1,085 KRW.
44The Korean National Index (http://www.index.go.kr) reports that the national density is 503,
but the density in the Greater Seoul area is 2,117 as of 2014.
45Available in the Korean Educational Statistics Service (http://kess.kedi.re.kr).
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than average expenditure on private tutoring for secondary school students.46 If
there are more children, spending per child is likely to be reduced because of budget
constraints (Becker and H.G. (1973)). Although very small, higher levels of income
and assets have significant and positive effects, which is also a convincing result. The
higher age gap of couples is linked with lower expenses for education. Intuitively,
the reason would be that younger spouses, mothers, are likely to have less influence
on the decision-making process (Reggio et al. (2011)). It has been reported that the
proportion of income under the control of mothers has a large and positive effect on
her children’s welfare (i.e., Thomas (1990)).
Table 2.4 shows estimates from the preferred IV regression ((2.2) and (2.3)).
Again, the unit of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW. The values of βˆ are highly
different in Table 2.3; here, all of them are now negative numbers, that is, it overall
shows a significant and negative effect. Also, the absolute value is larger than the
sample standard deviation. However, even though the estimate is still negative, the
estimate from the dependent variable excluding females is not significant. On the
other hand, the estimated effect on the amounts of expenditure excluding males is
significant and negative. The absolute value is almost two times the standard devia-
tion in this case. Thus, the effect is substantial compared to the average expenditure
in Table 2.1. The other estimates are generally similar to those in Table 2.3, but
some of them are insignificant.
The first-stage results show that both instrumental variables have significant ef-
fects (with an expected sign) on the dummy for coresidency. The positive effect of
living in the Greater Seoul area may reflect higher levels of income in the capital
46The Korean National Index (http://www.index.go.kr) reports that average monthly expense
for private education (for students attending elementary, middle, or high school) is 239,000 KRW
as of 2013. The Ministry of Education of Korea reports that the average (four-year) college tuition
per year is 6,667,000 KRW (approximately 555,583 KRW per month).
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region. The negative effect of years of education of wives can be related to bargaining
power. As noted above, 95% of members of the grandparent generation are parents
of their husbands. More educated wives may have higher levels of bargaining power,
and they may not want to live with parents of their husbands. The positive effect
of the number of college-attending children may reflect the relatively higher age of
households with them. It is somewhat surprising that the amounts of both income
and assets do not have significant effects on the dummy. It may be the case that the
dummy of living in the Greater Seoul area captures that effect or that the decision is
based on nonmonetary motivations.
In Section 2.3.1., I mention a caveat that the estimation is conditional on col-
lege attendance. If coresiding grandparents affect college attendance in the reverse
direction (stronger negative effect on males), the interpretation becomes ambiguous.
However, results from the regression, which only considers expenses for students from
elementary to high schools, show this is not the case. The estimated coefficients are
similar in both genders.47 The expenses in this context can be interpreted as invest-
ment for college entrance. Thus, the results suggest no gender gap in the motivation
for attending college. Overall, I argue that the caveat mentioned above does not
change the interpretation.
2.5.2 Results: Testing the Number of Decision-Makers
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 show estimated (from (2.5)) parameters which consist two
matrices, Γ and Θ. Although there are other coefficients which are also estimated
with Γ and Θ, I omit these values from the table because they are not directly used
in the following tests. For Γ, 45 out of 81 estimates are significant. This number
47The regression is from a subsample that consists of households without any college-attending
children. The results are available upon request.
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is higher than 36 out of 100 in Dauphin et al. (2011). Except for food and public
transportation, prices have negative effects on relative expenditure. The positive
coefficients of prices for foods and public transportation may be intuitive results
because they can be considered as essential goods of daily life. So the elasticities of
prices may be low compared to other categories.
On the other hand, many of estimated coefficients in Θ are not significant. Only
12 out of 36 estimates are significant although this ratio is still much higher than 6 out
of 30 in Dauphin et al. (2011). Regarding educational expenditure, which is the main
focus of this paper, it is observable that more educated coresiding grandparents have
positive effects on educational spending in households, conditional on coresidency. It
is possible that educated people are more likely to place higher value on educational
investment.
Table 2.10 reports χ2 test statistics for the two tests explained in Section 2.3.2.3.
For both tests, the first two hypotheses in the sequential approach (i.e., H = 0 and
H = 1) are strongly rejected and the third hypothesis (i.e., H = 2) is not rejected.
Hence, the results strongly suggest at least three decision-makers in households having
a coresiding grandparent-generation member.
2.5.3 Additional Comments on Results
To summarize, there is evidence that the negative effect on educational investment is
based on the preference of grandparent-generation members, and such preference is
reflected in the outcomes through the household decision-making process. Although it
is not the main focus of this paper, it would be valuable to explore the reason why older
people may have negative attitudes against educational investment, especially for
female children. The negative effect might be (partially) explained by risk aversion. It
has been documented that the degree of risk aversion increases when people reach age
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65 (Halek and Eisenhauer (2001)). Hence, if old people believe educational spending,
especially for girls, is a risky investment, their negative attitudes may be understood.
Another potential background of the grandparents’ attitudes is their perception of
gender differences in the expected return to education. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1,
there has been the norm of the eldest son supporting his parents in Korea. It means
that a higher level of human capital of male children will be more directly linked to
future support to the family compared to a human capital of female children. If this
is the case, the negative effect on female children may make sense. However, this
norm might have weakened over the years. Figure 1 shows that financial support for
parents-in-law relative to parents have increased as years go by. It can be interpreted
as daughters playing a more important role as supporters. In that sense, perception
about gender differences in the expected return to education of grandparents can be
very different from that of the younger generation. This difference in perception may
drive the negative effect.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Other Categories of Consumption and Saving
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show results from a specific component of consumption,
which is educational expenditure. To check whether the negative effect only exists
specifically for educational-related expenses, I report the results of supplementary
regression in Table 2.5. This table reports results from the regression of four different
dependent variables: the monthly amounts of household consumption for three dif-
ferent categories (medical goods, durable goods, outside food) and household saving.
If the coresidency shows similar negative effects across these goods or services, the
effects may not be related to the preference of grandparents regarding educational in-
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vestment. Alternatively, the effects may stem from features that affect overall levels
of consumption, such as time preference. Estimated coefficients of coresiding show
that the effects across categories indeed differ. The estimates are not significant for
durable goods, outside food, and saving. The significant and positive estimate for
medical goods or services makes sense because older people are likely to spend more
for this category (De Nardi (2010)).48
The coefficients of other independent variables are generally expected. Living in
the Greater Seoul area has mixed effects. It reduces the amount being saved, which
may be caused by higher living costs in the capital region. The effects on consumption
are positive or negative, depending on the category. It may be possible that outside
food and miscellaneous medical goods have larger elasticities compared to durable
goods, so consumers reduce their spending on them. The higher level of education of
the female spouse also show mixed effects. It is intuitive that there are strong positive
effects on spending for outside food and amounts of saving. The higher education level
of the female spouse is linked with higher bargaining power. Then, given that more
spending for outside food means less time for cooking and that the female lives longer
than the male, these signs are consistent with the spouse’s incentive. In the same
sense, the negative effect of age gap on saving is consistent with this logic because
a larger age gap can mean a lower bargaining power of the spouse. Higher levels of
income and assets show positive effects as expected.
48Unlike De Nardi (2010), Table 2.5 reports the negative effect of coresidency on household saving
although this coefficient is not significant. The difference in health insurance systems may cause the
different direction of this estimate. Korea has adopted a universal health insurance, and all hospitals
in Korea must accept this public insurance by the law. This is not the case in the United States
(for example, a 2009 article in New York Times, “Doctors Are Opting Out of Medicare,” discussed
this issue.).
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2.6.2 Noncoresiding Grandparents
Bogan (2015) explains that financial reasons create the negative effect of coresiding
on educational investment. If financial reasons are main drivers of the negative effect,
it may be possible to observe similar effects when households have grandparents who
are not living together but financially dependent. These households send substantial
amounts of money or goods to their grandparents (and/or grandparents-in-law) living
in other places. If we observe different effects, it suggests that financial reasons cannot
explain the negative effect observed above. Table 2.6 reports results from related
supplementary analysis. All other independent variables are the same with the main
regression, but the main regressor is now an indicator variable, which is equal to 1
when they have “financially dependent and non coresiding” parents (or parents-in-
law) and they do not have any coresiding grandparent-generation members.49 The
main coefficients show exactly opposite patterns compared to Table 2.4. There is
a strong positive effect of noncoresidency (and financial dependence) on educational
investment, especially for female children. In that sense, results of this supplementary
regression arguably support that financial reasons cannot explain the main negative
effect alone. It is worth mentioning that the estimated effects of two instrumental
variables on the main regressor have opposite signs. It gives additional credibility to
the instrumental variables. Coefficients of other variables are very similar with those
estimated in Table 2.4.
49The 11,257 observations used for the first and second columns include 1,925 households which
do not have grandparents both inside and outside; 862 households which have grandparents inside,
but not outside; and 8,470 households which have grandparents outside, but not inside. I exclude
households that have grandparents outside who send money to the main households. The number
of such households is less than 1% of the entire observations.
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2.6.3 School-attending Children
Table 2.7 shows results from the same regression with Table 2.4, but the observations
on having children younger than age five are excluded. The point of this robustness
check is the motivation of childcare. Even if, by construction, I exclude expenses
for childcare from educational investment, households can use other services, such
as tutoring, as an alternative to childcare service. Then, living with grandparents
can simply reduce the investment because there is a decrease in the usage of this
alternative to childcare. To check whether this story explains most findings from the
main specification, I run the regression with the subsample. Arguably, children in this
subsample demand childcare much less compared to younger children. Indeed, the
absolute values of estimates are much smaller than those from Table 2.4. However,
the main finding is still valid in the sense that the negative effect of coresidency stems
from female children. There are two other noticeable changes. First, the educational
level of wives have a positive effect. If spending for relatively older children is closer
to true investment than younger children, it can be true that more educated people
spend more by placing higher value on the investment. Second, the existence of sib-
ling(s) negatively affects the investment. If childcare is a case of basic necessities and
“investment” is a luxury good, then this negative effect makes sense. The remaining
estimates are similar, including the two instrumental variables.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the effect of coresidency with grandparents on their grandchil-
dren’s educational investment. To sum up, I show a negative effect especially for
female children.
First, I use the instrumental variable approach to estimate the effect. I use the
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Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) as the main data set for the regres-
sion. I find the negative effect of coresidency that is larger than the sample mean
of the dependent variable by using two instrument variables: the number of older
brothers of the household head and the per capita cultural infrastructure in the dis-
trict of residence. The negative effects of coresidency are not observed across other
consumption categories, such as medical expenses or expenses for durable goods. It
suggests that the negative effect cannot be simply thought as a result of financial
burden.
Second, to check whether the negative effect is from the preference of coresiding
grandparent-generation members, I apply two tests based on the collective model.
The two tests depend on two different types of variations: variations of prices and
distributional factors of the bargaining power. To estimate the parameters required
to calculate statistics for the two tests, I use household-level data from KLIPS and
district-level data on prices (especially the data on expenditure on different cate-
gories of consumption). The QUAIDS model is applied for the regression. Results of
both tests show that there are more than two decision-makers in households with a
grandparent-generation member. It suggests that the negative effect may stem from
the preference of grandparents through the decision-making process.
There are a few limitations which deserve to be mentioned. First, results are
subject to external validity. I use only data from Korea, so it is still questionable
whether the negative effect found in this paper is common across other countries which
have different economic and/or cultural backgrounds. Second, mainly because of data
limitation, I am not able to analyze the distribution of household resources for children
besides education. Further analysis would require information on the amounts of
consumption or expenses which are distributed to children for each category.
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Figure 2.1: The Ratio of Net Transfer with Parents-in-Law to with Parents
Note : The three different lines are produced separately based on the age of the
household head.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (The First Sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Expenditure on Education 32.04 34.40 13,650
Expenditure on Education (Boys) 31.68 35.84 10,242
Expenditure on Education (Girls) 31.64 36.25 8,260
Dummy for Having the Elder in Household 0.06 0.24 13,650
Years of Educ. of Spouse 12.67 2.51 13,650
Number of College Attending Children 0.36 0.61 13,650
Total Number of Children 1.86 0.57 13,650
Dummy for Homeownership 0.61 0.49 13,650
Annual Household Income 4820.66 3457.70 13,650
Age of Household Head 43.93 7.92 13,650
Age Gap between Head and Spouse 2.95 2.93 13,650
Number of Brother of Household Head 2.55 1.22 13,650
Number of Older Brother of Household Head 0.87 1.05 13,650
1. The monetary unit is 10,000 KRW.
2. Expenditure variables exclude childcare-related expenses.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics (The Second Sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Share for Food 0.29 0.12 986
Share for Outside Food 0.05 0.04 986
Share for Education 0.18 0.18 986
Share for Vehicle Maint. 0.16 0.11 986
Share for Health 0.06 0.08 986
Share for Culture 0.04 0.04 986
Share for Communication 0.10 0.04 986
Share for Clothes 0.04 0.03 986
Share for Pub. Transport 0.04 0.04 986
Monthly Expenses for Ten Categories 178.7 95.3 986
Log of Head Income 5.48 0.69 986
Log of (Head Income - Spouse Income) 5.19 0.91 986
Log of (Head Income - Grandparents Income) 5.44 0.70 986
Homeownership 0.83 0.37 986
Living Greater Seoul 0.42 0.49 986
Age of Head 51.96 8.44 986
Age of Spouse 48.33 8.66 986
Age of (co-residing) Grandparents 78.52 8.30 986
Educ. of Head 11.87 3.63 986
Educ. of Spouse 10.91 3.03 986
Educ. of Grandparents 3.15 3.91 986
Sex of Grandparents2 0.07 0.26 986
(Monthly) Income 438.66 337.23 986
(Monthly) Head Income 302.92 276.28 986
(Monthly) Spouse Income 43.56 72.22 986
(Monthly) Grandparents Income 8.07 24.92 986
1. The unit of monthly income-variables is 10,000 KRW.
2. It is calculated by imposing 1 for males and 0 for females.
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Table 2.3: Main Regression Results (OLS estimation)
Educational Expenditure (Per Child)
All Gender Only Male Only Female
Coresidence
0.773
(1.706)
0.648
(2.209)
0.748
(2.419)
Greater
Seoul
5.738∗∗∗
(0.863)
6.091∗∗∗
(1.012)
5.455∗∗∗
(1.193)
Educ. of
Spouse
-0.191
(0.209)
0.055
(0.241)
-0.100
(0.290)
# of College-
Children
27.478∗∗∗
(0.788)
21.861∗∗∗
(0.866)
31.997∗∗∗
(0.973)
# of
Children
−1.777∗∗
(0.718)
−4.577∗∗∗
(0.949)
−1.763∗
(0.989)
Net Amounts of
Asset
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
Income of
Household
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Age Gap of
Couple1
-0.236∗
(0.138)
-0.147
(0.169)
−0.375∗∗
(0.187)
R2 0.385 0.270 0.423
N 18,484 13,800 11,196
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Calculated as Age of Head−Age of Spouse.
1. The above table shows the results of (2.1).
2. Weighted by KLIPS-provided weights.
3. Errors are clustered by households.
4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
5. The unit of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW.
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Table 2.4: Main Regression Results (IV estimation)
Educational Expenditure (Per Child)
All Gender Only Male Only Female
Main
First
Stage
Main
First
Stage
Main
First
Stage
Coresidence
−39.493∗∗∗
(13.677)
−17.929
(15.251)
−60.567∗∗∗
(21.082)
Greater
Seoul
6.907∗∗∗
(1.228)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.013)
6.820∗∗∗
(1.277)
0.026∗
(0.014)
7.451∗∗∗
(1.842)
0.046∗∗∗
(0.015)
Educ. of
Spouse
-0.414
(0.270)
−0.005∗∗
(0.002)
-0.211
(0.284)
−0.006∗∗
(0.003)
-0.112
(0.406)
−0.006∗
(0.003)
# of
College-
Children
27.917∗∗∗
(0.975)
0.021∗∗
(0.009)
21.701∗∗∗
(0.989)
0.021∗∗
(0.009)
33.647∗∗∗
(1.286)
0.014
(0.010)
# of
Children
-0.893
(0.951)
0.016
(0.011)
−3.533∗∗∗
(1.125)
0.002
(0.013)
−0.418
(1.539)
0.028∗∗
(0.013)
Net
Amounts
of
Asset
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Income of
Household
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Age Gap
of
Couple1
−0.141
(0.185)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.149
(0.204)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.094
(0.304)
0.004
(0.003)
# of Older
Brother
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.033∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.036∗∗∗
(0.007)
Cul. Infra
of
District
0.006∗∗
(0.003)
0.006∗
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
R2 0.309 0.042 0.247 0.040 0.295 0.052
N 13,650 13,650 10,242 10,242 8,260 8,260
First F2 22.17∗∗∗ 16.772∗∗∗ 15.082∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Calculated as Age of Head−Age of Spouse.
2 F statistic for the null hypothesis that both coefficients of instrumental variables in the
first stage regression are zero.
1. The above table shows the results of (2.2) and (2.3).
2. Weighted by KLIPS-provided weights.
3. Errors are clustered by households.
4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
5. The unit of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW.
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Table 2.5: Supplementary Regression Results (IV estimation) : Household Consump-
tion
Household Consumption
Medical Durable Restaurant Saving
Coresidence
10.160∗∗
(4.698)
4.419
(4.424)
-0.764
(3.616)
-38.099
(36.090)
Greater
Seoul
-0.581
(0.359)
0.771∗∗
(0.327)
−0.961∗∗∗
(0.255)
−7.962∗∗∗
(2.175)
Educ. of
Spouse
−0.154∗∗
(0.068)
0.187∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.628∗∗∗
(0.039)
2.561∗∗∗
(0.372)
# of College-
Children
-0.415
(0.254)
0.319
(0.448)
−0.633∗∗∗
(0.212)
−2.455
(2.376)
# of
Children
−1.553∗∗∗
(0.310)
0.164
(0.253)
0.363∗∗
(0.177)
2.447∗
(1.476)
Net Amounts of
Asset
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
Income of
Household
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.010∗∗∗
(0.001)
Age Gap of
Couple1
0.183
(0.142)
0.084
(0.085)
-0.035
(0.042)
−0.780∗∗
(0.313)
R2 0.018 0.022 0.267 0.274
N 22,912 22,912 22,912 22,910
First F2 28.728∗∗∗ 28.728∗∗∗ 28.728∗∗∗ 28.728∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Calculated as Age of Head−Age of Spouse.
2 F statistic for the null hypothesis that both coefficients of instrumental
variables in the first stage regression are zero.
1. The above table shows the results of modified version of (2.2) and (2.3).
2. Weighted by KLIPS-provided weights.
3. Errors are clustered by households.
4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
5. The unit of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW.
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Table 2.6: Supplementary Regression Results (IV estimation) : Grandparents Living
Outside and Financially Dependent
Educational Expenditure (Per Child)
All Gender Only Male Only Female
Main
First
stage
Main
First
stage
Main
First
stage
Outside
25.032∗∗
(9.672)
6.964
(10.623)
39.080∗∗
(15.543)
Greater
Seoul
7.567∗∗∗
(1.513)
-0.101∗∗∗
(0.018)
7.056∗∗∗
(1.481)
−0.085∗∗∗
(0.020)
8.216∗∗∗
(2.507)
−0.118∗∗∗
(0.022)
Educ. of
Spouse
−0.559∗
(0.311)
0.010∗∗
(0.004)
-0.261
(0.312)
0.010∗∗
(0.005)
-0.490
(0.456)
0.014∗∗
(0.006)
# of
College-
Children
25.978∗∗∗
(1.114)
0.007
(0.013)
20.845∗∗∗
(1.074)
0.002
(0.014)
30.970∗∗∗
(1.410)
0.014
(0.015)
# of
Children
0.836
(1.017)
−0.043∗∗∗
(0.015)
−2.225∗∗
(1.188)
−0.019
(0.019)
1.416
(1.608)
−0.057∗∗∗
(0.020)
Net
Amounts
of
Asset
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Income of
Household
0.001∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
Age Gap
of
Couple1
−0.074
(0.191)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.046
(0.224)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.126
(0.287)
-0.004
(0.004)
# of Older
Brother
0.051∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.048∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.011)
Cul. Infra
of
District
−0.008∗∗
(0.004)
−0.010∗∗
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.005)
R2 0.312 0.067 0.262 0.056 0.271 0.079
N 11,226 11,226 8,452 8,452 6,917 6,916
First F2 18.967∗∗∗ 15.112∗∗∗ 11.360∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Calculated as Age of Head−Age of Spouse.
2 F statistic for the null hypothesis that both coefficients of instrumental variables in the
first stage regression are zero.
1. The above table shows the results of modified version of (2.2) and (2.3).
2. Weighted by KLIPS-provided weights.
3. Errors are clustered by households.
4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
5. The unit of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW.
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Table 2.7: Supplementary Regression Results (IV estimation) : Subsample with Chil-
dren Older than or equal to Age 5
Educational Expenditure (Per Child)
All Gender Only Male Only Female
Main
First
stage
Main
First
stage
Main
First
stage
Coresidence
−18.065
(11.335)
−2.797
(13.636)
−31.912∗
(17.368)
Greater
Seoul
6.250∗∗∗
(1.192)
0.035∗∗
(0.015)
6.550∗∗∗
(1.299)
0.026
(0.016)
6.154∗∗∗
(1.787)
0.049∗∗∗
(0.018)
Educ. of
Spouse
0.541∗∗
(0.280)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.613∗∗
(0.302)
−0.005
(0.003)
0.857∗∗
(0.404)
−0.006∗
(0.004)
# of
College-
Children
24.778∗∗∗
(0.901)
0.017∗
(0.009)
18.928∗∗∗
(0.970)
0.018∗
(0.010)
31.212∗∗∗
(1.117)
0.011∗
(0.010)
# of
Children
−6.486∗∗∗
(1.013)
0.008
(0.013)
−7.660∗∗∗
(1.256)
−0.007
(0.016)
−7.504∗∗∗
(1.632)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.017)
Net
Amounts
of
Asset
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Income of
Household
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
Age Gap
of
Couple1
−0.260
(0.175)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.178
(0.212)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.373
(0.280)
0.003
(0.004)
# of Older
Brother
−0.040∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.037∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.041∗∗∗
(0.007)
Cul. Infra
of
District
0.007∗∗
(0.004)
0.007∗
(0.004)
0.006
(0.005)
R2 0.330 0.043 0.232 0.043 0.371 0.055
N 10,127 10,127 7,906 7,906 5,989 5,989
First F2 22.89∗∗∗ 17.410∗∗∗ 15.415∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Calculated as Age of Head−Age of Spouse.
2 F statistic for the null hypothesis that both coefficients of instrumental variables in the
first stage regression are zero.
1. The above table shows the results of modified version of (2.2) and (2.3).
2. Weighted by KLIPS-provided weights.
3. Errors are clustered by households.
4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
5. The unit of dependent variables is 10,000 KRW.
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Table 2.9: Regression Results (QUAIDS) : Θ matrix
Head
Income
Educ. of
Grandp.
Sex. of
Grandp.
# of
Older Bro.
Food
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.004)
Outside
Food
0.022∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.002)
Educ.
-0.013
(0.009)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.006)
Vehicle
Maint.
0.016∗∗
(0.007)
−0.002∗
(0.000)
0.014
(0.014)
0.010∗∗
(0.004)
Medical
−0.011∗∗
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.003)
Culture
0.003
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.001
(0.002)
Communi-
cation
-0.002
(0.002)
−0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
Clothes
0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.001)
Public
Trans.
−0.004∗∗
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.002)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.10: Statistics for Two Tests
Rank of M Rank of Θ
Proposition 2 Proposition 3
Rank 0 2 4 0 1 2
χ2
Statistics
273∗∗∗
(0.000)
31.54∗
(0.065)
4.349
(0.930)
16, 432∗∗∗
(0.000)
214∗∗∗
(0.000)
4.776
(0.989)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1. P-values are in parentheses.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 The First Test
The test statistic of the Wald test is expressed by χ2R =
g(ψ)T [
∂g(ψ)
ψ
V̂ ar(ψ)(
∂g(ψ)
ψ
)T ]−1g(ψ), where R is the number of restrictions; ψ
is a set of parameters; and g(·) is a vector of restrictions. Both g(ψ) and ψ change
as a different H0 is applied. The below briefly explains how restrictions (and corre-
sponding parameters) are constructed. Note that
∂g(ψ)
ψ
is very complex in A.2. and
A.3.. Hence I calculate the value for this matrix by calculating
gr(ψp + )− gr(ψp)

for each rth restriction and pth parameter, rather than deriving the analytical
solution for the matrix.
2.8.1.1 Rank(M) = 0 (Unitary model)
The null hypothesis is equivalent to say that Γ is a symmetric matrix. In this paper,
Γ is a 9× 9 matrix, so there are 9× (9− 1)/2 = 36 restrictions which must hold.
2.8.1.2 Rank(M) = 2 (at least two decision-makers)
Proposition 2 tells that M is anti-symmetric. Hence all the elements in its main
diagonal must be zero. Following Browning and Chiappori (1998) (Lemma 3), the
following restrictions should hold for all (i, k) such that k > i > 2:
mik =
m1im2k−m1km2i
m12
,
where mik is (i, k) element of M. The number of restrictions is 21.
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2.8.1.3 Rank(M) = 4 (at least three decision-makers)
According to Dauphin et al. (2011), with a specific assumption, rank(M) = 4 if and
only if the following restrictions are satisfied for all (i, k) such that k > i > 4:50
mik = [m12(m3im4k −m3km4i) +m13(m2km4i −m2im4k) +m14(m2im3k −m2km3i +
m1i(m23m4k −m24m3k +m2km34) +m1k(−m23m4i −m24m3i −m2im34))]/(m12m34 −
m13m24 +m14m33).
The number of restrictions is 10.
2.8.2 The Second Test
It begins with the singular value decomposition of a matrix ΘT , ΘT = UΣV. Σ,
a K × N matrix, has singular values as elements in its diagonal. Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) suggest a statistic to test the rank. The fundamental intuition is from
an equation, ΘT = AqBq + Aq,⊥ΛqBq,⊥, where Aq is a K × q matrix; Bq is a q × N
matrix; Λq is a (K − q) × (N − q) matrix; Aq,⊥ is a K × (K − q) matrix; and Bq,⊥
is a (N − q) ×N matrix. If Λq = 0, the rank of ΘT is equal to q. In short, the test
of rank(ΘT ) = q is equivalent to the test of Λq = 0. Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
explain how these matrices can be expressed in terms of U and V, and how the test
statistic can be defined based on the estimated A, B, and Λ matrices. To summarize,
the statistic is written by χ2 = λ̂q
T
(Ω̂q)
−1λ̂q. λ̂q is a vector of values of Λ̂q, and Ω̂q is
a matrix defined as (B̂q,⊥ ⊗ Âq,⊥
T
) ̂V ar(vec(ΘT ))(B̂q,⊥ ⊗ Âq,⊥
T
)T . This statistic has
χ2(K−H)(N−H) as its limiting distribution.
50The determinant of the first (left-upper) 4× 4 submatrix of M is nonzero.
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3 Does More Generous Child Care Assistance Pol-
icy Have Larger Impacts?
3.1 Introduction
For families with children, the labor supply decision should be related to their usage
of child care services. Unless all their children participate in one full-time activity
(e.g., attending a K-12 school), parents may require a child care service if both want
to work. They may consider a child care service from a neighborhood day care center
or an informal service (e.g., a family member, such as a grandparent). Alternatively,
they may decide one parent remains at home to provide child care services. With this
choice, they reduce the total amount of labor supply provided by the household.
In terms of pricing, informal services from a relative may be cheaper compared to
a formal service provider who may require increased revenue. However, an informal
service may not be an option for many families. The importance of a child care
assistance policy arises from the high monetary costs of child care services, which are
often not affordable, especially for poor families.
According to an article published by the Center for American Progress, average
weekly childcare costs for families making income below the poverty line are $103.51
This is a burdensome amount against the average monthly family income is $1,239.
If the government wants to improve these families financial situation, then the gov-
ernment could allocate money through a welfare policy. However, welfare policies are
costly, so the government may require low income families to increase their income by
51https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2013/05/08/62519/the-
importance-of-preschool-and-child-care-for-working-mothers/.
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supplying more to the labor force. Based on the intuition that human capital can be
accumulated by working, an increased effort into the labor supply is also helpful to
increase their human capital. Hence, working more can benefit the family in the long
run. The challenge lies in that, with a high level of childcare costs, the family may
not increase their labor supply because these costs offset any increase in income. If
policies can alleviate burdens caused by childcare costs, then poor families will have
more opportunity to increase income and accumulate human capital. This expected
result suggests the importance of child care assistance policies for low income families.
Many researchers studied child care costs on the maternal labor supply (e.g., An-
derson and Levine (1999), Ribar (1992), Kimmel (1998), Blau and Robins (1988),
Blau and Robins (1989), Connelly (1992) and Mason and Kuhlthau (1992)), and all
report its negative effects on behavior. Following an increasing trend for the introduc-
tion or expansion of public child care assistance policies, several papers studied the
effect of universal (i.e., not limited to poor households) child care assistance policies
on the maternal labor supply (e.g., Baker et al. (2008), Gelbach (2002) and Lefebvre
and Merrigan (2008)), and these authors reported significant positive effects.
This paper focuses on the child care assistance policy of the U.S. for low income
households. Through welfare reform in 1996, the federal government consolidated
four existing child care assistance programs into the Child Care and Development
Fund (CCDF), which also provided states greater autonomy for manipulating specific
components of their child care assistance policies. As a result, interstate and time
variations of the policy have increased since the reform. Blau and Tekin (2007) used
the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families to confirm that subsidy recipients of
the child care assistance policy were more likely to be employed. Herbst (2010) used
CPS and SIPP data to analyze the effect of the size of expenditures of the child care
assistance policy and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on the labor supply.
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They argued that employment decisions of single mothers are sensitive to personal
wages and childcare costs as well as the number of children and wage level. As
expected, the scale of expenditures from a child care assistance policy offers positive
effects on the labor supply.
Although the literature confirms that child care assistance policies can improve
the maternal labor outcome of a single parent (specifically, a low income family),
the national budgets for such policies are limited. According to the Center for Law
and Social Policy, the total child care spending was on a rising trend between 1997
(around $4 billion) and 2003 (around $12 billion) but has been stagnant since.52
Hence, it is crucial to spend these limited funds now more efficiently than before. As
described above, each state has substantial flexibility to design a child care assistance
policy, such as determining its policy’s income eligibility criteria, copayment rates,
and reimbursement rates. So, if information for the effect of each component of these
policies on the maternal labor supply is available, then policymakers might be enabled
to spend stagnated funding levels while still achieving better results effectively.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the effects of specific com-
ponents of child care assistance policies on outcomes of the maternal labor market.
Maternal labor supply behaviors are analyzed by exploring the effect of interstate and
time variations of copayments and reimbursement rates. In this context, copayments
refer to the dollars required by families to pay while receiving assistance. If copay-
ment rates are high, then the merit of receiving assistance decreases as these rates
may prevent recipients from taking the subsidies to increase the labor supply.
Reimbursement rates determine the maximum amount offered by a state govern-
ment to child care providers who serve families receiving child care assistance. This
52Child Care Assistance Spending and Participation in 2012,
http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication-1/ccspending2012-Final.pdf.
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is related to both the supply and demand sides. If this rate is too low compared to
market rates, then service providers may refuse to serve families who receive child care
assistance. High-quality care providers may be more likely to refuse service to recip-
ients as the reimbursement may not sufficiently compensate their higher costs. Also,
even if a service provider accepts recipients, then they may still invest less money in
the quality of its care if profits are less than what is earned from other customers.
For example, these services may not be enabled to pay adequate salaries to attract
qualified staff or may not invest in educational resource. These types of supply side
behaviors indirectly affect decisions by families as recipients might expect their chil-
dren to be matched only with low-quality service providers when reimbursement rates
are too low. If families anticipate they can only utilize low-quality service providers,
then they may not desire to increase the labor supply by opting to self-provide child
care.
The effects of these two components of child care assistance policies on the ma-
ternal labor (demand) supply and childcare industry (supply) are analyzed. Based
on empirical regression, expected effects are observed that higher copayments make
mothers reluctant to participate in the labor force and higher reimbursement rates
encourage an increase in the labor supply. However, results from an industry-level
analysis show that the effects on the supply side are weak and not consistent with
expectations.
A fundamental limitation of this research is limited data. Complete information
for the analysis that determine the amounts for copayments and reimbursement rates
is not available and reduces the reliability of estimated coefficients. A proxy variable
is used to alleviate this challenge and is further described in Section 3.3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the
essential aspects of the U.S. child care assistance policy. Section 3.3 explains the data
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followed by a description of the empirical equations and included variables in Section
3.4. Section 3.5 reports analysis results and Section 3.6 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 The Child Care Assistance Policy in the U.S.53
3.2.1 The Funding Structure
The federal funding resource for the child care assistance policy in the U.S. is the Child
Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG). CCDBG is supplemented with state
matching and maintenance-of-effort (MOE) funds. In addition, each state can provide
further supplementation with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block
grants either directly or by transferring their funds (up to 30%) to the CCDBG or
a combination of the CCDBG and Social Service Block Grant (SSBG). For example,
in 2014, California’s federal funding allocations included Mandatory Funds (based on
the state’s expenditure in child care programs in the 1990s) of $85,593,217, Matching
Funds (based on the number of children under age 13 in the state) $211,167,718, and
Discretionary Funds (subject to annual appropriation) $259,203,894.54
The Discretionary Fund amounts are decided by a formula reflecting three state-
level considerations, including the Young Child factor (the ratio of the number of
children under age five in a state to the number of children under age five nationwide),
School Lunch factor (the ratio of the number of children in a state who receive free or
reduced price school lunches under the National School Lunch Act to the number of
such children nationally), and Allotment Proportion factor (a weighting determined
by dividing the three-year averaged national per capita income by the three-year
53The information in this section is based on the reports produced by the National Women’s Law
Center.
54http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/occ/resource/ccdf-state-and-territory-funding-allocations.
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averaged state per capita income).55 These three components of the federal funding
comprise approximately 65% of the total funding for California in 2014. In addition,
a large share of funding from the state government comes from the state’s share
of Matching Funds (decided by the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP)
rate).56 So, the majority of funding for a state (for California in 2014, roughly 90%)
is decided by these factors described above.57
3.2.2 Components of the Child Care Assistance Policy
Each state maintains a high degree of autonomy in managing of child care assistance
policies. First, states can set income eligibility limits for the assistance, which can
be up to 85% of the state median income. While it is possible to set the level below
this figure, many states set limits far below the 85% of state median income level.
As of February 2014, New Mexico limits to $39,060 for a family of three, which is
approximately 81% of the state’s median income. However, Maryland set its limit
to $29,990 for a family of three, which is approximately 34% of the state’s median
income.
Second, each state handles a different amount of people waiting to receive assis-
tance, even though they are eligible. These waiting lists vary in size by state, and,
as of February 2014, no waiting list existed in Illinois while 40,047 children waited to
receive similar assistance in Massachusetts.
55http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/occ/resource/ccdf-funding-allocations-and-periods-of-
availability.
56The FMAP is calculated based on the relative income level of each state.
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2014/FMAP2015/fmap15.cfm.
57Details based on the information from the website of Center for Law and Social Pol-
icy (http://www.clasp.org/) and the Office of the Administration for Children & Families
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/occ).
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Third, copayments vary by state as these amounts depend on income and family
composition. As of February 2014, South Dakota did not charge copayments for a
family of three with an income at 100% of poverty and a single child, while Hawaii
sets $203 as the copayment for the same family.
Fourth, reimbursement rates to child care providers vary by state with rates de-
pending on factors such as area and age of the child. While Federal regulations
recommend rates are set at the 75th percentile of the current market, which allows
the recipients access to 75% of their community provider, many states set rates be-
low this level or do not update the market rates. As of February 2014, Ohio set
its reimbursement rate to match the 26th percentile of 2010 market rates. However,
California set its reimbursement rate at the 85th percentile of 2005 market rates.
3.3 Data
The data for this study is sourced from the March CPS from 2006 to 2013, available
at IPUMS, which includes information on labor supply behavior (labor force partici-
pation, employment status) and other socioeconomic factors such as total household
income, education, marital status, race, age, children’s age, number of children, and
area of residence.58
The annual publication from the National Women’s Law Center provided details
on child care assistance policies based on surveys completed by state administrators
covering four key components of income eligibility criteria, waiting lists, copayments,
and reimbursement rates.59
In this paper, two aspects of these components are analyzed. First, interstate
58https://cps.ipums.org/cps/.
59http://www.nwlc.org/.
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and time variations comparisons on the amount of copayments is considered. A
drawback of this review is that the data only include the copayment amounts for
two hypothetical families, a family of three with an income at 100% or 150% of the
federal poverty level. For the empirical analysis, only the corresponding amount for
the family at the 100% level is incorporated due to the available observations. Many
states do not allow households to receive the subsidy if their household income is
150% of the federal poverty level, so no information is provided in these cases. Since
the copayments may vary across households, the figures used in this analysis must be
understood as proxies.
In addition, instead of using the absolute amount of copayments, a relative mea-
sure is applied, defined as a ratio of the amount of copayments for a family of three
with an income at 100% of the federal poverty level to each region’s CPI-U (Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers) index.60 61 This measure captures the relative
price level by indirectly taking the income difference of regions into account so is not
directly related local labor market conditions.
Second, the interstate and time variations of the reimbursement rates for child care
providers is used with data including monthly state reimbursement rates, the 75th
percentile of state market rates (again, as the recommended level for reimbursement
from Federal regulations), and the percent difference between the state reimbursement
rate and this 75th percentile. These figures may vary by geographic area within a
state or the age of the child. Similar to the copayment data, these figures are only for
the selected area (e.g., the most populous county in each state) and the selected age
60Available at the website of Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov).
61The March CPI-U index of class A is used with a population of more than 1,500,000 covering
the four geographic regions of Northeast urban, Midwest, South, and West.
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of the child (one and four years). The empirical analysis includes the reimbursement
rates for a family of three with a child aged one. If the information for only a
specific area in a state is available, then a sample living in this area is incorporated.
Again, these figures must be understood as proxies for measuring the overall level of
reimbursement rates of a state or a specific area.
Proxy variables may cause issues in estimating the effects of true variables and
a hypothetical example is explained in the following. Assume the exact value of
copayments for a family in each state depends linearly on its household income. If
a state with a higher level of copayments is applied to a hypothetical family with a
higher (lower) slope in income in the copayment relationship, then there will be a
positive (negative) correlation between the level of copayments and the unobservable
error term.62 The real situation is more complex because the relationship suggests
the amount of copayments may not be entirely linear. For example, the copayment
schedule of Minnesota, as of October 14, 2013, that decide the amount based on to
which income group a household belongs includes households with a gross income
between $14,648 and $19,529 have biweekly copayments of $2 and those between
$19,530 and $20,330 have biweekly copayments of $20. This apparent nonlinearity
may limit the reliability of the findings.
County Business Patterns (CBP), a data set covering 2006 to 2012, are used to
investigate the effects of the policy on the supply side.63 The data set includes infor-
62As a simplified version, assume that yi,s = α+β1copayi,s+β2reimbi,s+γXi,s+i,s, where yi,s is a
variable of interest and Xi,s is a control vector. If, copayi,s = copaymin,s+νsincomei, where (νs > 0),
copaypov,s = copaymin,s + νsincomepov, where copaymin,s is the minimum level of copayments in
state s. In this case, the exact amount of copayment for i is copayi,s = copaypov,s + νs(incomei,s −
incomepov). Finally, the estimated equation will be yi,s = α+β1copaypov,s+β2reimbi,s+γXi+ui,s,
where ui,s = i + νsβ1(incomei,s − incomepov). Hence, cov(copaypov,s, ui,s) matters to estimate β1
correctly.
63http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/.
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mation about the number of paid employees, annual payroll amounts, and the number
of establishments in the “Child Day Care Services” sector for each county. To reflect
demographic difference across counties, data from the American Community Survey
(ACS) 1-year estimates of the number of people aged 0 to 14 is combined with relative
measures for the number of paid employees and the number of establishments.64 For
adjusting to the different price levels of each region, the payroll amounts per capita
are divided by each region’s CPI-U index.
Finally, the empirical analysis includes state-level variables related to the decision
on the size of funding for child care assistance policies, which help control potential
endogeneity of the variables related to the policies. For example, policymakers may
determine the size of funding based on the economic condition of the state, so there
may exist unobservable factors that influence both the size of funding (indirectly, the
level of copayments and reimbursement rates) and the labor market conditions.
For the three variables that decide the size of Discretionary Funds as described
previously, the first and third variables are available from the ACS estimates and Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis, respectively. The second variable is not publicly available,
so the number of people under the poverty line is instead used as a proxy variable,
which is available from the ACS estimates. In addition, the relative number of people
aged 0 to 14 used to control Matching Funds and the state median income to control
FMAP are incorporated into the analysis.65
Several restrictions are applied to the sample to address the scenario for analysis
adequately. First, only married females aged 21 to 64 with one child are included,
64Available at http://factfinder.census.gov/ (ACS Demographic and Housing estimates).
65Available at the website of the U.S. Census Bureau with single-year estimates from the Annual
Social and Economic Supplement of CPS.
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because the available data is mapped only to a family of three. Second, the single child
in the family must be aged less than 12 because recipients may only have children up
to this age (Herbst (2010)). Third, the sample data only includes individuals living in
the same matched area within the state (e.g., a specific county in the state) because
the information of reimbursement rates is only available for a specified region. Fourth,
states without data on child care assistance are eliminated from the sample.
The first panel in Table 3.1 summarize the statistics of the household (or indi-
vidual) level variables by year, which are used to perform the first regression model
as described in the following section. After applying the restriction outlined above,
the remaining sample consists of 36 states (including the District of Columbia) for
a total sample of 10,559. The proportion of people living in metropolitan regions is
very high, which is expected as the information of reimbursement rates are typically
available for the most populous county within a state. Therefore, in many cases, the
matched people in the sample reside in the most populous county. The educational
attainment value is calculated as the years of education based on a reported final
grade. Weekly working hours provides a measure of labor supply as respondents an-
swered this question based on the hours they worked during the week prior to the
survey. Additional measures, such as the number of weeks they supply labor, are
based on the information from the previous calendar year.
The second panel in Table 3.1 summarize the statistics of state or area level vari-
ables by year based on 45 states (including the District of Columbia) included in the
second regression model. The reimbursement rates are listed as the difference to the
75th percentile market rate. For example, -20 represents that the reimbursement rate
is less than 20% of the 75th percentile market rate. Overall, the generosity of child
care assistance policies has decreased during the sample period as an upward trend
for the copayments and a downward trend for the relative reimbursement rates com-
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pared to the 75th percentile market rate exist which may reflect the simultaneously
constrained budgets from both federal and state governments.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Baseline Model
The first empirical equation estimates the effect of child care assistance policies on
the maternal labor supply expressed as
yi,s,t = α + τs + ηt + β
T
1 cs,tI
1
i,s,t + β
T
2 cs,tI
1
i,s,tI
2
i,s,t + γ
TXi,s,t + δ
TZs,t + i,s,t, (3.1)
where yi,s,t represents the maternal labor supply of individual i living in state s
at time t, I1i,s,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the household income of
the previous calendar year is lower than the income eligibility criteria, I2i,s,t is an
indicator equal to 1 when the child’s age is ineligible for public schooling (i.e., less
than four), Xi,s,t is a vector for the control variables of age, race, education, the
area of residence (e.g., a metropolitan region), and household income excluding the
female’s labor income, Zs,t is a vector of the state-level control variables related to
the decision of the CCDF funding, and τ and η are state and time dummy variables,
respectively.66 67 The vector cs,t contains the measures for the child care assistance
policy (e.g., the amount of copayments divided by each region’s CPI-U index and the
66Reimbursement rates may vary within a state and sometimes only the information about a
single area is available. Observations are included only if the residence is matched to area in the
state with data on reimbursement rates.
67I1i,s,t cannot perfectly reflect reality because there are exceptions for the limits applied to these
sample cases. For example, many states allow families previously receiving assistance to continue
until they earn an income higher than the eligibility criteria. As of 2013, 21 states allow this
exception. A robustness check described below only uses states that do not allow this exception.
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percent difference between the state reimbursement and state market rates) of state s
at time t. Clustered errors are allowed at the state level because they may account for
correlations within a state over time. Here, vector coefficients to be estimated are β1
and β2. Each vector includes two coefficients with each reflecting the size of the effects
of one of the two measures of the child care assistance policy on the maternal labor
supply (hereafter, β1 = [β1,1, β1,2] and β2 = [β2,1, β2,2], where the first component
of each vector corresponds to the copayment, and the second corresponds to the
reimbursement rates). The difference between β1 and β2 is that β2 may capture the
potential effects of public schooling on the effects of the child care assistance policy.
The estimated components of β1 and β2 are expected to be negative (for copayments)
and positive (for reimbursement rates), respectively, because more attractive child
care assistance policies may encourage eligible mothers to supply more to the labor
force.
The second empirical equation estimates the effect of a variable for the reimburse-
ment rates on child care providers, represented by the state-level expression:
ss,t = α + τs + ηt + ω
T cs,t + δ
TZs,t + s,t, (3.2)
where ss,t is the measure of the supply side variables in state s at time t (the num-
ber of paid employees per child, payroll amounts per employee, and the number of
establishments per child in the “child day care services sector”), Zs,t is a vector of
the state-level control variables related to the decision of the CCDF funding, and τ
and η are state and time dummy variables, respectively. cs,t contains the measures
of the child care assistance policy of state s at time t. Here, the coefficients related
to the focus of this paper are included in ω = [ω1, ω2], which reflect the effects of
a state’s child care assistance policy on the supply side variables of the child care
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market. Again, the estimated components of ω1 and ω2 are expected to be negative
(for copayments) and positive (for reimbursement rates), respectively for all supply-
related variables because lower copayments and higher reimbursement rates can be
interpreted as a positive demand shock to the market.
As I mentioned above, Zs,t is included in both equations to reduce the concern for
the potential endogeneity of cs,t. For the first regression, if estimating the coefficient
vector δT is not of concern, then it is possible to replace Zs,t by a state-and-year
dummy, which may help to capture the effects of other state-level variables not in-
cluded in Zs,t that vary by year. In this paper, δ
T is not of primary interest, so a
state-and-year dummy is included instead of Zs,t. Finally, following two equations
are regressed:
yi,s,t = α + τs + ηt + τxηt + β
T
1 cs,tI
1
i,s,t + β
T
2 cs,tI
1
i,s,tI
2
i,s,t + γ
TXi,s,t + +i,s,t, (3.3)
ss,t = α + τs + ηt + ω
T cs,t + δ
TZs,t + s,t. (3.4)
3.4.2 Robustness Check
Three robustness checks are performed for the first regression. First, the potential
endogeneity of the indicator variable, I1i,s,t, included in the first equation must be
considered because economic agents can manipulate their amounts of the labor supply
and control income levels. For example, it is possible that some families deliberately
lower income to become eligible for a child care assistance policy. If the characteristics
of these families are different from characteristics of families no behaving in this way,
then including I1i,s,t may create an endogeneity problem. To address this concern,
the robustness of the results is checked by using an alternative indicator variable
equal to 1 when the household income is lower than the federal poverty line. In
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addition, waiting lists may be a concern if they are long and not expected to clear
within a short time period, causing people to not respond to changes in a child care
assistance policy. States with a long waiting list may also have a tighter budget
constraint compared to states without a waiting list. In this case, these states may
have difficulty administering other policies that may impact the labor market. To
address these issues, the above estimation process is repeated by including only states
without a waiting list. The above estimation process is again repeated by including
only states that do not allow the exception for the income eligibility limit.
Table 3.7 summarize the list of states included in each regression as well as the
robustness checks. Some states are dropped due to missing information, and others
are eliminated because the data do not provide sufficient geographic information to
match residential areas to the area representing the reimbursement rate information.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 provides the results of the regression based on (3.3). For the coefficients
of the interaction term with the first dummy, the amount of the copayment had
the expected sign as well as a significant effect on the labor supply behavior. For
example, the estimated coefficient of β1,1 shows that one unit increase in the adjusted
copayment reduces approximately 18 units of the weekly working hours dependent
variable. Here, the adjusted copayment is defined as the ratio of the amount of the
copayment for a family of three with an income at 100% of the federal poverty level
to each region’s CPI-U index. Therefore, one unit increase of this index corresponds
to approximately a $200 increase in copayments. In this sense, a dollar increase in
copayments (in real terms) raises the weekly working hours by 0.09 on average. The
reimbursement rates has the expected sign for its effects, but the level of significance
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is lower than that of copayments. For the case of weekly working hours, a 1% increase
in the relative reimbursement rates, based on the 75% percentile market rates, drive
weekly working hours up by 0.2 units. For the coefficients of the interaction term
with the second dummy, except for one case, all signs are expected, but the level of
significance is lower than those for the first dummy. Age and educational attainment
have strong effects on labor supply behavior. More educated people are more likely
to supply the labor force. The estimated effect of age is unexpected as the sample
covers from 21 to 64. However, most observations are from individuals within the
90th percentile age about 47, so strong positive estimates may be plausible.
Table 3.3 through Table 3.5 show the results of the regression used to perform the
robustness checks. All three tables include the results of the estimated coefficients
from (3.3), but each performs the robustness checks differently. Table 3.3 is based on
the same observations of Table 3.2 but the definition of the first dummy variable is
equal to 1 when the household income is lower than the federal poverty line, instead of
each state’s income eligibility criteria. The observations used for Table 3.4 consist of
people living in states with no waiting lists. Table 3.5 eliminates the states having the
exception of income eligibility criteria for continuing recipients. Overall, the results
are robust for the estimated coefficients of β1 and β2,2 but not for β2,1 (although the
estimated coefficients of β2,1 are not significant).
Table 3.6 overviews the results of the regression based on (3.4) featuring two
significant estimated coefficients of ω2. These suggest that higher reimbursement
rates cause higher payrolls and more childcare facilities per capita. Another estimated
coefficient of ω2 (for the number of employees) implies that higher reimbursement rates
result in more employees working in the childcare industry. However, the estimated
coefficients of ω1 are not significant and show the mixed sign, but the small number of
observations may be problematic. In addition, even without an issue due to a small
118
sample, the market size for the subsidy recipients may still be too small, compared
to the size of the child care market. In this case, even if there are substantial effects
at the individual level, then the cumulative effects of the policy on the entire market
may be negligible.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the effects of child care assistance policies are analyzed at the individ-
ual and the industry levels. Specifically, the effects of copayments and reimbursement
rates on the maternal labor supply behavior and the industry-level variables are es-
timated. The primary obstacle for this estimation is potential endogeneity, which
is minimized by including state-level variables that are considered in the decision-
making process of the size of funding for child care assistance policies. Although
these variables cannot determine 100% of the funding, a large proportion of the total
size of the funding is controlled with these variables.
For variables regarding the labor supply behavior, the estimated coefficients show
the expected sign. Higher copayments discourage maternal labor supply, and higher
reimbursement rates encourage maternal labor supply. However, estimated coeffi-
cients show that the effects of copayments are significant, but these coefficients are
relatively less significant for the effects of the reimbursement rates. Furthermore,
three robustness checks are performed to minimize various concerns about the data,
which provide similar results to the baseline.
However, for the industry-level variables, results are not consistent with the ex-
pected sign. The estimated coefficients are small and less significant compared to
the results of the individual-level regression. The small number of observations used
for this regression may suggest the results are less reliable. Also, it is possible that
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subsidy recipients constitute only a small fraction of the entire market so the effects
of the policy may be negligible.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, a lack of the data may limit the findings from this
paper. The proxy variables utilized for the copayments and reimbursement rates may
create issues for correctly estimating the effects if there exists a systematic correlation
between these proxy variables and the mechanisms that decide the value of copay-
ments for each household. Additional informative data are required to obtain more
meaningful and reliable results.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Household or Individual-level Variables
Metro
0.94
(0.23)
0.95
(0.22)
0.91
(0.28)
0.93
(0.26)
0.92
(0.26)
0.92
(0.27)
0.93
(0.26)
0.93
(0.25)
Income
88,109
(74,585)
93,836
(81,062)
91,505
(75,143)
91,630
(70,071)
95,086
(82,791)
92,287
(68,169)
94,056
(72,061)
97,393
(82,434)
Age (child)
4.69
(4.28)
4.66
(4.15)
4.61
(4.19)
4.59
(4.19)
4.54
(4.10)
4.82
(4.08)
4.76
(4.24)
4.81
(4.17)
Age
34.34
(8.01)
34.42
(8.10)
34.44
(8.25)
34.71
(8.19)
34.66
(8.11)
35.38
(8.09)
35.40
(8.11)
35.19
(7.98)
Black
0.10
(0.30)
0.08
(0.27)
0.08
(0.27)
0.09
(0.29)
0.09
(0.29)
0.08
(0.28)
0.08
(0.27)
0.08
(0.27)
Educ
14.09
(2.51)
14.21
(2.76)
14.23
(2.75)
14.24
(2.79)
14.50
(2.70)
14.42
(2.78)
14.44
(2.68)
14.59
(2.70)
Labor
Participation
0.69
(0.46)
0.69
(0.46)
0.71
(0.45)
0.69
(0.46)
0.73
(0.44)
0.71
(0.45)
0.72
(0.45)
0.71
(0.45)
Employed
0.63
(0.48)
0.64
(0.48)
0.64
(0.48)
0.62
(0.48)
0.65
(0.48)
0.63
(0.48)
0.65
(0.48)
0.66
(0.48)
Working
hrs (Wkly)
22.10
(19.69)
22.90
(19.74)
23.31
(19.66)
22.61
(19.95)
23.48
(19.89)
22.56
(19.57)
23.66
(19.45)
23.34
(19.15)
State or Region-level Variables
Copay
67.91
(45.16)
76.87
(51.64)
76.89
(49.09)
81.02
(54.85)
75.8
(67.56)
85.16
(62.12)
88.31
(59.20)
·
Reimb
-13.41
(11.32)
-11.55
(11.82)
-15.33
(13.39)
-15.6
(15.0)
-17.36
(14.92)
-19.93
(12.34)
-21.18
(13.19)
·
Adj.copay
0.34
(0.23)
0.37
(0.25)
0.36
(0.23)
0.38
(0.26)
0.35
(0.31)
0.38
(0.28)
0.39
(0.26)
·
CPI-U
201.284
(8.41)
207.32
(9.06)
215.114
(9.22)
214.367
(9.86)
218.701
(9.93)
224.415
(10.0)
230.183
(9.96)
·
1. “Reimb” represents the difference to the 75th percentile market rate.
2. All individual variables are weighted by CPS provided weights.
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Table 3.2: Regression Results (The First Model)
Variable
Labor force
participation
Employment
Hours of
working
(weekly)
Adj-copay
(1st)
−0.504∗∗∗
(0.121)
−0.477∗∗∗
(0.126)
−17.675∗∗∗
(5.19)
Reimb
(1st)
0.0026
(0.0017)
0.004∗∗
(0.0019)
0.2∗∗
(0.085)
Adj-copay
(1st and 2nd)
0.035
(0.1)
-0.008
(0.108)
-1.593
(4.13)
Reimb
(1st and 2nd)
0.0033∗∗
(0.0015)
0.002
(0.002)
0.0436
(0.06)
Age
0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0006)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.274∗∗∗
(0.04)
Black
0.08
(0.03)
0.082∗∗
(0.03)
4.257∗∗∗
(1.263)
Metro
0.008
(0.008)
0.007
(0.007)
0.262
(0.283)
Educ
0.024∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.022∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.95∗∗∗
(0.146)
Other income
(−8.85×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.24× 10−7)
(−9.07×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.11× 10−7)
−0.00004∗∗∗
(4.78× 10−6)
R2 0.127 0.115 0.119
N 10559 10559 10559
1. This table includes the results of (3.3).
2. Weighted by CPS-provided weights.
3. “Adj-copay” represents the dollar amounts of the copayments divided by
each region’s CPI-U index.
4. “1st” represents the variable is multiplied by the first dummy variable
defined in the equation. The same interpretation applies for “1st and 2nd”.
5. The clustered-error is considered.
6. The data included are from 2006 to 2013.
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Table 3.3: The First Robustness Check (The First Model)
Variable
Labor force
participation
Employment
Hours of
working
(weekly)
Adj-copay
(3rd)
−0.403∗∗
(0.165)
−0.4∗∗∗
(0.144)
−16.649∗∗
(6.297)
Reimb
(3rd)
0.005∗
(0.003)
0.005∗
(0.0028)
0.199
(0.133)
Adj-copay
(3rd and 2nd)
-0.054
(0.21)
-0.112
(0.203)
-5.933
(6.838)
Reimb
(3rd and 2nd)
0.0025
(0.0034)
0.0012
(0.003)
0.034
(0.132)
Age
0.006∗∗∗
(0.0006)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.0009)
0.291∗∗∗
(0.04)
Black
0.086∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.086∗∗∗
(0.03)
4.44∗∗∗
(1.252)
Metro
0.009
(0.009)
0.008
(0.007)
0.325
(0.296)
Educ
0.028∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.114∗∗∗
(0.137)
Other income
(−7.24×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.39× 10−7)
(−7.37×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.14× 10−7)
−0.000046∗∗∗
(4.8× 10−6)
R2 0.111 0.1 0.103
N 10559 10559 10559
1. This table includes the results of (3.3) with the different first dummy equal
to 1 when the level of household income is lower than the federal poverty line.
2. Weighted by CPS-provided weights.
3. “Adj-copay” represents the dollar amounts of the copayments divided by
each region’s CPI-U index.
4. “3rd” means the variable is multiplied by the third dummy variable equal
to 1 when the household income is lower than the federal poverty line. The
same interpretation applies for “3rd and 2nd”.
5. The clustered-error is considered.
6. The data included are from 2006 to 2013.
123
Table 3.4: The Second Robustness Check (The First Model)
Variable
Labor force
participation
Employment
Hours of
working
(weekly)
Adj-copay
(1st)
−0.55∗∗∗
(0.102)
−0.594∗∗∗
(0.112)
−22.43∗∗∗
(4.261)
Reimb
(1st)
0.003∗
(0.0023)
0.0017
(0.0018)
0.103
(0.0738)
Adj-copay
(1st and 2nd)
0.089
(0.095)
0.069
(0.121)
2.176
(3.812)
Reimb
(1st and 2nd)
0.0032
(0.002)
0.0023
(0.002)
0.116
(0.069)
Age
0.006∗∗∗
(0.0008)
0.0074∗∗∗
(0.00075)
0.309∗∗∗
(0.043)
Black
0.022
(0.037)
0.023
(0.035)
2.275
(1.586)
Metro
0.0014
(0.009)
0.002
(0.0086)
0.251
(0.343)
Educ
0.025∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.05∗∗∗
(0.168)
Other income
(−7.88×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.45× 10−7)
(−8.25×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.26× 10−7)
−0.000035∗∗∗
(4.81× 10−6)
R2 0.144 0.127 0.131
N 7092 7092 7092
1. This table includes the results of (3.3) only with states with no waiting lists.
2. Weighted by CPS-provided weights.
3. “Adj-copay” represents the dollar amounts of the copayments divided by
each region’s CPI-U index.
4. “1st” represents the variable is multiplied by the first dummy variable
defined in the equation. The same interpretation applies for “1st and 2nd”.
5. The clustered-error is considered.
6. The data included are from 2006 to 2013.
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Table 3.5: The Third Robustness Check (The First Model)
Variable
Labor force
participation
Employment
Hours of
working
(weekly)
Adj-copay
(1st)
−0.489∗∗∗
(0.115)
−0.521∗∗∗
(0.122)
−21.048∗∗∗
(4.116)
Reimb
(1st)
0.0035∗∗
(0.0015)
0.0032
(0.002)
0.155∗∗
(0.066)
Adj-copay
(1st and 2nd)
0.08
(0.131)
0.069
(0.147)
3.632
(4.79)
Reimb
(1st and 2nd)
0.0036
(0.0024)
0.0032
(0.003)
0.103
(0.085)
Age
0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.302∗∗∗
(0.046)
Black
0.096∗
(0.046)
0.098∗∗
(0.045)
4.151∗∗
(1.82)
Metro
0.014
(0.0086)
0.011
(0.008)
0.458
(0.328)
Educ
0.024∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.053∗∗∗
(0.189)
Other income
(−8.58×10−7)∗∗∗
(2.01× 10−7)
(−9.41×10−7)∗∗∗
(1.76× 10−7)
−0.00004∗∗∗
(7.35× 10−6)
R2 0.147 0.134 0.143
N 4896 4896 4896
1. This table includes the results of (3.3) only including states without the
income eligibility exception.
2. Weighted by CPS-provided weights.
3. “Adj-copay” represents the dollar amounts of the copayments divided by
each region’s CPI-U index.
4. “1st” represents the variable is multiplied by the first dummy variable
defined in the equation. The same interpretation applies for “1st and 2nd”.
5. The clustered-error is considered.
6. The data included are from 2006 to 2013.
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Table 3.6: Regression Results (The Second Model)
Variable
Employee per
child
Payroll per
capita
Establishment
per child
Adj-copay
0.0007
(0.0005)
−0.448
(0.343)
0.00006
(0.00004)
Reimb
0.000009
(0.000006)
0.009∗∗
(0.004)
0.000001∗∗
(0.0000005)
N 313 313 313
1. This table includes the results of (3.4).
2. Weighted by each area’s population.
3. The potential heterogeneity and autocorrelation are considered.
4. The data included are from 2006 to 2012.
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Table 3.7: List of States Included in Each Regression
States Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6
Alabama Y Y N N Y
Alaska N N N N Y
Arizona Y Y Y Y Y
Arkansas N N N N N
California Y Y N N Y
Colorado N N N N Y
Connecticut Y Y Y N Y
Delaware Y Y Y Y Y
District of Columbia Y Y Y N Y
Florida Y Y N N Y
Georgia N N N N Y
Hawaii Y Y Y Y Y
Idaho N N N N Y
Illinois N N N N Y
Indiana N N N N Y
Iowa Y Y Y Y Y
Kansas Y Y Y Y N
Kentucky Y Y Y N Y
Louisiana Y Y Y Y Y
Maine N N N N Y
Maryland Y Y Y Y Y
Massachusetts Y Y N N Y
Michigan Y Y Y Y Y
Minnesota N N N N Y
Mississippi Y Y Y Y Y
Missouri Y Y Y N Y
Montana Y Y Y Y N
Nebraska N N N N Y
Nevada Y Y Y Y Y
New Hampshire N N N N N
New Jersey Y Y Y N Y
New Mexico Y Y Y Y Y
New York Y Y N Y Y
North Carolina Y Y N Y Y
North Dakota Y Y Y Y Y
Ohio Y Y Y N Y
Oklahoma Y Y Y Y Y
Oregon Y Y Y Y Y
Pennsylvania Y Y N N Y
Rhode Island Y Y Y N Y
South Carolina Y Y Y N Y
South Dakota N N N N Y
Tennessee Y Y N Y Y
Texas N N N N N
Utah Y Y Y N Y
Vermont Y Y Y Y Y
Virginia N N N N N
Washington Y Y Y Y Y
West Virginia Y Y Y N Y
Wisconsin N N N N Y
Wyoming Y Y Y N Y
Total 36 36 28 20 45
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